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A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading 
William H.J. Hubbard† 
The plausibility pleading regime of Twombly and Iqbal has generated con-
tinuing controversy and concern over its effects on the ability of plaintiffs, particu-
larly certain categories of civil rights plaintiffs, to bring cases in federal court. This 
Article assesses the effects of plausibility pleading by undertaking a novel thought 
experiment: What would plaintiffs’ filing and pleading decisions look like in a 
world with no pleading standard at all? In other words, what if there were no mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and every filed case reached discovery? 
This Article shows that in this hypothetical world, plaintiffs usually either file fac-
tually detailed, plausible complaints or do not file at all. In short, pleading stand-
ards generally will not affect whether the plaintiff files suit or the court dismisses 
the complaint. Perhaps most surprisingly, this is true even for cases in which in-
formation asymmetries favor the defendants. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, not judges, are 
the gatekeepers to court, and pleading practices are driven not by doctrine but by 
settlement strategy. This analysis generates empirical predictions, which find sup-
port in a wide range of qualitative (though admittedly inconclusive) evidence. Fur-
ther, this thought experiment may turn the normative critique of Twombly and Iq-
bal on its head: Plausibility pleading may advance, rather than undermine, the 
“liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plausibility pleading can 
make it easier for plaintiffs with risky but worthwhile cases to have their day in 
court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly1 and Ashcroft v Iqbal2 
put to pasture the venerable regime of “notice pleading” in federal 
civil procedure and introduced the concept of “plausibility plead-
ing,”3 the result was “shockwaves throughout the legal communi-
ty—for academics, practitioners, and judges alike.”4 After over fif-
ty years of near dormancy, the scholarly literature on pleading 
exploded.5 The academic reaction to Twombly and Iqbal reflected 
a sense of concern—even alarm—at an apparent revolution in 
pleading and court practice.6 And seven years after Iqbal, the 
turmoil still reverberates. 
 
 1 550 US 544 (2007). 
 2 556 US 662 (2009). 
 3 See Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 Pepperdine L Rev 1063, 
1063–65 (2009). 
 4 Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan L Rev 1293, 1305 (2010) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Smith, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 1063 (cited in note 3) (“No decision 
in recent memory has generated as much interest and is of such potentially sweeping 
scope as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.”); Alexander A. 
Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 Ind L J 119, 122 (2011) (noting a near con-
sensus “among academic observers that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard marks a 
sharp break with the past”); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly 
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 Am U L Rev 553, 554 (2010) (characterizing Twombly 
as “[s]eemingly without prior warning”); Richard A. Epstein, Twombly, after Two Years: 
The Procedural Revolution in Antitrust That Wasn’t *4 (GCP, July 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4424-Z6GY (characterizing the Twombly decision as “out of the blue”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 BC L Rev 431, 431 (2008) (stating that 
Twombly was “a startling move by the U.S. Supreme Court”). 
 5 See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 Baylor L Rev 90, 137–
38 (2009):  
Until recently, the scholarly literature on pleading standards was remarkably 
thin, with only a few significant pieces written from the 1930s through the ear-
ly 2000s. Widespread scholarly interest in pleading is a remarkably recent 
phenomenon, tracing its birth to the Supreme Court’s 2007 opinion in Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly.  
I cannot begin to survey the literature on Twombly. For a survey, see Steinman, 62 Stan 
L Rev at 1296–97 nn 10, 12–13 (cited in note 4). 
 6 See, for example, Steinman, 62 Stan L Rev at 1310 (cited in note 4) (“The conven-
tional wisdom is that Twombly and Iqbal herald a new era for federal pleading standards.”); 
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This continuing tumult is due to two fundamental factors. 
First, the stakes are understood to be extraordinarily high. 
Scholars tend to describe the pleading requirements of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) as making judges the gate-
keepers to the federal courts.7 And if “pleading is the key to the 
courthouse door,”8 then changing pleading standards means 
changing the number of plaintiffs who will be turned away from 
court. 
As originally envisioned by the drafters of the FRCP, and as 
affirmed in the seminal case Conley v Gibson,9 the gatekeeping 
function of federal judges was minimal: they used a standard of 
notice pleading, which required only that a pleading give the de-
fendant notice of the plaintiff’s grievance.10 Notice pleading re-
flected a deliberate break from prior pleading regimes, whose 
cumbersome requirements were seen as traps for the unwary.11 
Rather than having courts decide cases based on the niceties of 
pleading, the “liberal ethos” of the FRCP required only the barest 
of allegations, so that cases could be decided “on the merits, by ju-
ry trial, after full disclosure through discovery.”12 
Today, though, notice pleading in federal court is no more, 
and plausibility pleading reigns: the plaintiff must allege 
 
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L J 1, 28 (2010) (calling Twombly a “radical departure from 
prior practice”); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What 
Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us about Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 BU L 
Rev 1217, 1235 (2008) (noting that a majority of scholars agree that “Twombly amounts to 
a sea of change in the traditional pleading standard”). 
 7 See, for example, Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 Wake Forest L 
Rev 937, 942 (2011); Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Desta-
bilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L Rev 821, 824 (2010). 
 8 Steinman, 62 Stan L Rev at 1295 (cited in note 4). 
 9 355 US 41 (1957). 
 10 Id at 47. 
 11 See William W. Dawson, ed, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States with Notes as Prepared under the Direction of the Advisory Committee and 
Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules 301 (ABA 1938) (quoting Major Edgar Bronson 
Tolman). 
 12 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 Colum L Rev 433, 439 (1986). The development of the regime of fact pleading, 
which preceded the adoption of the FRCP, as well as the development of simplified pleading 
systems (including the Field Code in the nineteenth century), which culminated in the 
adoption of the FRCP in 1938, may be of interest to the reader. For an account, see, for ex-
ample, id at 433–44; Twombly, 550 US at 573–76 (Stevens dissenting); Stancil, 61 Baylor L 
Rev at 109–12 (cited in note 5); Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Com-
plaint Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 Penn St L Rev 1191, 
1196–1205 (2010); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 
U Pa L Rev 441, 447–52 (2010). 
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”13 And the liberal ethos of the FRCP has become something 
else—what Professor A. Benjamin Spencer calls the “restrictive 
ethos,” which eschews discovery and trial in favor of dispositions 
at the pleading stage.14 
Scholars have expressed concern for civil rights plaintiffs 
(and especially for employment discrimination plaintiffs), who 
often lack direct evidence of the defendants’ motives at the out-
set of litigation.15 In this way, the argument goes, Twombly and 
Iqbal create a “paradox of pleading”: “[c]ivil rights plaintiffs . . . 
cannot state a claim because they do not have access to docu-
ments or witnesses they believe exist; and they cannot get access 
to those documents or witnesses without stating a claim.”16  
As a doctrinal matter, this is surely true. But what effects 
have come to pass? While many observers predicted large, ob-
servable changes in either filing or dismissal rates, others were 
less sure.17 For example, Professor Paul Stancil surmised that 
“the vast majority of litigated cases already satisfy the height-
ened [pleading] standard.”18 Thus, scholars have been careful to 
caution that discerning the effects of Twombly and Iqbal is ulti-
mately an empirical matter, and careful observation is necessary 
to inform our understanding of pleading.19 
This brings us to the second factor fueling the continued 
ferment on pleading standards: despite a large body of empirical 
work on Twombly and Iqbal, the quantitative evidence on the ef-
fects of plausibility pleading on plaintiffs is inconclusive to date. 
 
 13 Twombly, 550 US at 570. 
 14 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 Geo Wash L 
Rev 353, 358–66 (2010).  
 15 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Prac-
tice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U 
Pa L Rev 517, 519–20, 533–35 (2010); Reinert, 86 Ind L J at 123 (cited in note 4) (“Par-
ticular attention has been paid to the impact of the Iqbal and Twombly rules on civil 
rights litigation, where informational asymmetry is often at its highest point but where 
federal courts and federal law have played an important historical role.”). 
 16 Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Par-
adox of Pleading, 62 Stan L Rev 905, 927 (2010). See also Hatamyar, 59 Am U L Rev at 602 
(cited in note 4) (noting that Twombly and Iqbal have a “potentially negative effect on ac-
cess to justice”). Justice John Paul Stevens made a similar argument for antitrust cases in 
his Twombly dissent. Twombly, 550 US at 586–87 (Stevens dissenting). 
 17 Note that throughout this Article, “dismissal” refers to dismissal for failure to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
 18 Stancil, 61 Baylor L Rev at 168 (cited in note 5). 
 19 See, for example, Hoffman, 88 BU L Rev at 1222 (cited in note 6); Miller, 60 Duke 
L J at 2 (cited in note 6); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civ-
il Rights Litigation, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 157, 158 (2010). 
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The best meta-analysis of this literature is by Professor David 
Engstrom, who notes serious problems with the reliability of re-
sults due to various selection effects in the data and collects re-
sults from the literature consistent with the number of affected 
cases being anywhere from zero to a substantial fraction of all 
cases.20 While this literature will continue to mature and will 
serve as the ultimate arbiter of the effects of plausibility plead-
ing, right now the time is ripe for a fresh approach to both the 
theory and the data animating our analysis of pleading. 
In this Article, rather than focus on pleading doctrine or on 
quantitative evidence, I develop a theory of pleading practice and 
consider qualitative evidence. I make a case for reconsidering 
what effects we ought to expect plausibility pleading to have. 
In doing so, this Article raises the following questions: What 
if federal judges are not the gatekeepers to civil litigation in the 
federal courts? What if, in practice, the gatekeeping standard 
has nothing to do with FRCP 8, Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal? 
What if, for more cases than we expect, neither notice pleading 
nor plausibility pleading affects how pleadings are written, let 
alone whether complaints are dismissed? And what if, for most 
of the cases for which pleading standards make a big difference, 
it is plausibility pleading, and not notice pleading, that better re-
flects the liberal ethos of the FRCP? 
My analytical approach is to attempt to capture, in a simpli-
fied way, essential features of the practice of pleading and litiga-
tion and then to consider how we might expect pleading stand-
ards to affect litigation behavior. I undertake a novel thought 
experiment: What if there were no pleading standard at all, such 
that no complaints could ever be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim? In this hypothetical pleading regime, I argue, rational 
plaintiffs will still (usually) have the incentive either to file factu-
ally detailed complaints or not to file at all. Pleading standards do 
 
 20 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 Stan L Rev 1203, 1230–34 (2013). The latter number is due to the fact that 
now-Professor Jonah B. Gelbach estimates only a lower bound for the share of cases neg-
atively affected and finds that the lower bound is significantly different from zero. Jonah 
B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L J 2270, 2331–32, 2338 (2012). Thus, while this 
finding does not indicate that a substantial fraction of all cases are in fact affected, it is 
consistent with such a possibility. For further discussion of selection effects in this litera-
ture, see generally William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, 
with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud 35 (2013). See also Theodore 
Eisenberg and Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100 Cornell L 
Rev 193, 202–07 (2014). 
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not dictate plaintiffs’ strategies for filing and pleading. Instead, 
filing and pleading practices reflect plaintiffs’ judgments about 
the costs and benefits of litigation and the best means of obtain-
ing settlements. 
The basic argument, which is detailed in Part I.A, is 
straightforward. Litigation is expensive, and this has two key 
consequences for civil practice: First, both plaintiffs and defend-
ants prefer to settle rather than to litigate. Second, plaintiffs will 
not bother to file suits if they do not stand a good chance of win-
ning. Because of this, defendants are willing to settle with plain-
tiffs whose cases are strong enough to justify a lawsuit, but de-
fendants would prefer not to settle with plaintiffs whose claims 
are weak; such plaintiffs will abandon their claims if they cannot 
obtain settlements without suing. 
If defendants cannot perfectly discern plaintiffs with serious 
claims from others, plaintiffs with strong claims need a way to 
credibly signal the strength of their cases. Civil procedure itself 
provides just such a mechanism: pleading! Through factually de-
tailed pleading, a plaintiff communicates the strength of her case 
and thereby facilitates settlement. Under this view, the contents 
of pleadings in federal practice are driven not by the prospect of 
motions to dismiss but by the impetus to settle. Judges serve a 
minimal gatekeeping function because plaintiffs and their law-
yers are the primary gatekeepers to the courts.21 In this way, I 
offer a functional theory of pleading, according to which 
Twombly and Iqbal are best understood as effecting a subtle, ra-
ther than dramatic, change in law and practice.22 
The remaining portions of Part I then consider possible lim-
its on this analysis. Perhaps surprisingly, the most often cited 
concern with plausibility pleading standards—asymmetry of in-
formation favoring defendants23—does not affect my central thesis. 
 
 21 Of course, the role of plaintiffs’ attorneys as gatekeepers to the civil justice sys-
tem has long been recognized. See, for example, Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee 
Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 Judicature 22, 22 (July–Aug 1997) 
(“Lawyers, particularly contingency fee lawyers, are gatekeepers who control the flow of 
civil cases into the courts.”). The relevance of this fact to pleading practice, however, has 
received scant attention. 
 22 This theory complements doctrinal arguments by Professors Adam Steinman and 
Robert G. Bone, as well as others. See Steinman, 62 Stan L Rev at 1314–27 (cited in note 
4); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 Iowa L 
Rev 873, 882–90 (2009). 
 23 See, for example, Spencer, 49 BC L Rev at 481–82 (cited in note 4) (lamenting 
that a plausibility pleading standard forecloses “discovery . . . for such complainants in 
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In contrast, pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) plaintiffs may be 
affected by pleading standards; so too may claims involving 
asymmetry of costs or unusually high stakes. 
Part II then considers how the practices of screening for 
merit by plaintiffs’ attorneys and detailed pleading may influ-
ence the behavior of judges. Because detailed pleadings signaling 
merit are the norm even under the most liberal pleading stand-
ard, judges will see pleadings lacking detail as aberrant and as 
signaling a lack of merit. If judges feel pressure to control their 
caseloads or to resolve litigation inexpensively, they may tend to 
dismiss such complaints regardless of the (ostensible) pleading 
standard. 
Part III discusses the positive, empirical implications of this 
theory and finds support for these implications in familiar, if 
somewhat old-fashioned, sources of data: aggregate court statis-
tics, practitioner surveys, state law surveys, and doctrine. While I 
deliberately eschew the growing, but currently inconclusive, sta-
tistical literature on the effects of Twombly and Iqbal (including 
my own work in this area),24 I hasten to note that as the results 
from this literature become clearer over time, these results will 
either confirm or reject the predictions of this theory. For now, 
though, the evidence I survey strongly supports the view that 
plausibility pleading has wrought no major change in practice. 
Part IV considers potential normative implications of this 
theory of pleading. It raises the possibility that plausibility 
pleading embraces rather than rejects the liberal ethos of the 
FRCP. As my thought experiment makes clear, neither notice 
pleading nor plausibility pleading has much effect on the reality 
that most cases are resolved neither by jury trial nor after full 
disclosure through discovery. Thus, the liberal ethos of resolving 
cases “on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through 
discovery”25 will always, regardless of pleading standards, be lit-
tle more than an unrealized ideal—with one exception: we surely 
want cases resolved on the merits. The challenge to honor the 
liberal ethos is a challenge to design procedure to resolve cases 
on the merits in an environment in which trial (and even com-
pleted discovery) will always be the exception. As I argue herein, 
most of the cases that are affected by pleading standards involve 
 
circumstances where the needed supporting facts lie within the exclusive possession of 
the defendants”). 
 24 See generally, for example, Hubbard, 42 J Legal Stud 35 (cited in note 20). 
 25 Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 439 (cited in note 12). 
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cases less likely to be resolved on the merits. Consistent with 
this goal, however, special care may need to be reserved for pro 
se and IFP plaintiffs in the application of pleading standards. 
Perhaps more provocatively, I argue that plausibility plead-
ing may benefit plaintiffs with risky but worthwhile claims. 
While the concern that plausibility pleading hurts plaintiffs be-
cause of information asymmetries is chimerical, there remains 
the concern that the vague plausibility pleading standard con-
fers discretion to judges and, in exercising this discretion, judges 
may (consciously or unconsciously) give play to antiplaintiff bi-
ases. If so, does the plausibility standard hurt plaintiffs? Not 
necessarily. If anything, the effect is likely the reverse. After all, 
if a judge holds an antiplaintiff bias, this bias will affect the case 
sooner or later. As a plaintiffs’ attorney, when would you rather 
have the judge reveal her bias: early on, when you can cut your 
losses, or later, after you have spent tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars litigating the case? Put another way, would you 
rather have the judge reveal her bias by dismissing your com-
plaint for failure to state a claim, or by granting summary judg-
ment to the defendant at the close of discovery? In the modern 
world of expensive discovery and extensive judicial control over 
fact-finding through summary judgment and other means, giving 
plaintiffs an early signal of judicial bias reduces the expected cost 
of litigation for plaintiffs, empowering plaintiffs to bring claims 
that would otherwise be too risky given the cost. In a world of 
high litigation costs, plausibility pleading serves the liberal ethos 
of the FRCP. 
To be clear, I make no claim that plausibility pleading is an 
unvarnished good. Its likely effects are multifaceted, and there 
are some obstacles to settlement on the merits that pleading 
rules simply cannot address, such as litigation driven primarily 
by highly asymmetric costs. But as my theory of pleading makes 
clear, the effects of plausibility pleading, both for good and for ill, 
are likely modest. Whether courts’ objective is to impose a new 
“restrictive ethos” or to update the “liberal ethos” to account for 
modern realities, they will have to look elsewhere to effect large 
changes. 
I.  A THEORY OF PLEADING, LITIGATION, AND SETTLEMENT 
Let us undertake a thought experiment: imagine a pleading 
regime in which no complaint can be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim, so long as it names a defendant and describes 
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some kind of injury. I call this hypothetical regime “no pleading 
standard”—although this may not be far from the original con-
ception of notice pleading.26 
Since it is costly to prepare a lengthy complaint with factual 
details and legal background, one might expect that under no 
pleading standard, complaints would be short, sparsely pleaded 
documents that would surely be dismissed if Twombly were to 
suddenly appear. This conclusion would be too hasty. While de-
tailed pleading is costly, so is litigation. I argue that in general, 
even under a regime of no pleading standard: (1) only a plaintiff 
who has facts establishing a plausible claim will file a lawsuit, 
and (2) when the plaintiff files suit, she will plead those facts in 
(some) detail. 
In Part I.A, I present the argument in basic form. In subse-
quent sections, I elaborate on the basic argument, showing both 
its surprisingly broad applicability and its limitations. 
A. Pleading with No Pleading Standard 
Litigation is expensive; thus, a plaintiff will not bother to file 
suit if she does not stand a decent chance of winning. But a plain-
tiff will not believe that she has a good chance of winning unless 
she has in mind some facts that persuade her that she can win the 
suit. And again, because litigation is expensive, the plaintiff 
would prefer to settle rather than to undertake the lengthy pro-
cess of litigation and trial. Thus, she has every incentive to signal 
the strength of her case by communicating her facts to the poten-
tial defendant if doing so will encourage the defendant to settle. 
The defendant, also concerned about litigation costs, would 
prefer to settle rather than to go to trial with a plaintiff who 
brings a strong claim, but the defendant is wary of a plaintiff 
with a weak claim bluffing her way to a settlement. The de-
fendant will be reluctant to settle absent some assurance that 
the plaintiff’s claim is strong enough that it is worth paying a 
settlement. Thus, it is essential that the plaintiff with a plausi-
ble claim credibly communicate her facts to the defendant. 
 
 26 Dean Charles Clark, the primary architect of the FRCP, toyed with the idea of 
abolishing pleading standards altogether, as the English had done in their Equity Rules 
of 1912, which abolished the demurrer. In testimony in 1938 on the new rules governing 
pleading, he remarked, “We don’t go as far as the English rules, which I personally think 
we should eventually.” Dawson, Rules of Civil Procedure at 240 (cited in note 11) (quoting 
Clark’s statement about FRCP 12 to the Institute on Federal Rules of the American Bar 
Association).  
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The plaintiff does so through pleading, which is a nearly ideal 
mechanism for making a credible signal: a complaint is made in 
writing, made publicly available, and signed under penalty of sanc-
tions against both the plaintiff and her lawyer.27 And a factually de-
tailed complaint is costly to prepare, insofar as it takes the time 
and effort of attorneys (and others) to gather relevant information 
and present the information as factual allegations in a coherent 
pleading.28 In other words, a factually detailed, plausible complaint 
makes the plaintiff’s case credible by backing up her claims with 
her money and reputation. Crucially, nothing in this argument de-
pends on the existence, let alone strictness, of a pleading standard. 
A simple model formalizes this intuition somewhat. There is 
a (potential) plaintiff and a (potential) defendant. The plaintiff 
has been injured and the defendant may be liable for the injury. 
The plaintiff can file a lawsuit seeking a judgment in the amount 
ܬ against the defendant. If the plaintiff sues and the parties do 
not settle, it will cost the plaintiff ܥ to litigate. Before deciding 
whether to sue, the plaintiff must assess the information availa-
ble to her in order to make a judgment about her likelihood of 
winning the lawsuit. If we call this probability ݌, then the ex-
pected judgment is simply the judgment amount times the prob-
ability that she wins the judgment: ݌ܬ. Given this expected 
judgment, the plaintiff will be willing to sue and go to trial if the 
expected judgment from litigating exceeds the costs of litigating: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ݋݂ ݓ݅݊ ൈ ܬݑ݀݃݉݁݊ݐ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ
൒ ܥ݋ݏݐ ݋݂ ݈݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
(1a) 
݌ܬ ൒ ܥ (1b) 
 
 27 See, for example, FRCP 11; 28 USC § 1927. FRCP 11 requires that “factual con-
tentions have evidentiary support,” lest the pleading party or its attorneys face sanctions. 
FRCP 11(b)(3). By pleading detailed facts, a plaintiff could preempt any threat of a mo-
tion for FRCP 11 sanctions. Pleading parties thus have yet another incentive to plead 
facts in support of legal claims regardless of the pleading standard. See Randal C. Picker, 
Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 S Ct Rev 161, 176.  
 28 There are also the fees associated with filing the complaint, but these fees are 
modest in US practice. To file a civil suit in federal court, for example, the plaintiff must 
pay both the filing fee and the administrative fee. Currently, those fees sum to $400. See 
28 USC § 1914 (setting a $350 filing fee for a civil action in US district courts); District 
Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Aug 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9LR-4LVZ (setting a $50 administrative fee 
for initiating a civil action in US district courts). 
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If not, then it is not worth pursuing litigation; the plaintiff 
stands to lose more in litigation costs than she stands to win in 
judgment.29  
 From this, one can immediately see that for any claim for 
judgment amount ܬ that costs ܥ to litigate, only a plaintiff with a 
relatively strong case (a higher probability ݌ of winning) will be 
willing to sue: 
 
݌ ൒ ܥ ܬൗ      (2) 
Importantly, the facts available to the plaintiff determine ݌. A 
plaintiff who lacks facts implying a relatively high likelihood of 
success will abandon her claim, unless she can convince the de-
fendant to settle. Such a plaintiff might approach the defendant 
and demand a settlement without filing a lawsuit, but a rational 
defendant will anticipate this possibility and will know that if he 
refuses settlement, the plaintiff will simply abandon her claim 
rather than hale him into court. 
This, in turn, creates a problem for a plaintiff who has a 
strong claim. She, too, would prefer to settle out of court rather 
than to sue, because litigation is costly. But a defendant may re-
fuse to settle if the defendant cannot reliably distinguish be-
tween this plaintiff and another plaintiff with a weaker claim. 
Thus, it benefits the plaintiff with the strong case to file a law-
suit and use the complaint as a credible signal of her willingness 
to pursue litigation. Detailed pleading is costly, but it allows the 
plaintiff with a strong claim to separate herself from the plaintiff 
with a weak claim. By doing this, she brings the defendant to the 
settlement table.30  
 
 29 This is a standard result of the canonical Landes-Posner-Gould model. Note that 
although this discussion assumes risk neutrality, nothing turns on this assumption. 
(Technically, if the plaintiff is risk-averse, then the criterion for willingness to litigate is 
whether the certainty equivalent of ሺ݌ܬ െ ܥሻ is greater than zero. See Andreu Mas-Colell, 
Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 185–86 (Oxford 1995). 
Risk aversion will only amplify the plaintiff-screening effect that I describe: because liti-
gation is risky, risk-averse plaintiffs may avoid it even if the expected judgment exceeds 
the monetary cost.  
 30 American Nurses’ Association v Illinois, 783 F2d 716, 723–24 (7th Cir 1986) (Posner):  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers, knowing that some judges read a complaint as soon as it is 
filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to “educate” (that 
is to say, influence) the judge with regard to the nature and probable merits of 
the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by 
showing the defendant what a powerful case they intend to prove. 
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Applying some numbers to this model makes it more concrete. 
Litigating in federal court can be expensive even for plaintiffs 
bringing relatively modest claims. A rule of thumb is that a party 
ought to be prepared to spend $100,000 to litigate in federal 
court.31 Now imagine a plaintiff with a somewhat large claim of 
$250,000.32 Plugging these numbers into Expression 2 reveals 
that a plaintiff in this scenario will be willing to sue only if: 
 
݌ ൒ 100,000/250,000 (3a) 
݌ ൒ 0.4 (3b) 
 Hence, this plaintiff is willing to sue if she believes that her 
likelihood of winning the judgment is at least 40 percent. Let’s 
say that our hypothetical plaintiff believes that her chances are 
at least this good. Why does she believe this? There could be any 
number of reasons that our plaintiff could give, depending on the 
circumstances: “I had a contract with the defendant, payment 
was due to me last month, and I never received payment.” “I was 
struck by a car, and the defendant looks like the guy who was 
driving that car.” “My boss was always mean to me, even though 
I always did a good job. After I complained about his treatment 
of women in my office, I was fired.” 
These reasons for believing that she has a decent chance of 
winning might be good reasons, or they might not be. These rea-
sons might be a far cry from what it would take for the plaintiff 
to ultimately prevail on the merits. But any plaintiff who is able 
to answer the (hypothetical) question “Why do you think you 
 
 31 Although I am told this $100,000 figure from time to time by practitioners, I 
make no claim that this rule of thumb is well-documented. And because the argument 
here depends on how much the plaintiff must be prepared to spend, not how much the 
plaintiff actually spends, the available empirical data are not that helpful. In Part I.B, 
however, I refine this exercise in a way that allows use of actual litigation expenditures, 
and I redo the exercise with numbers based on a large empirical survey of practitioners’ 
actual litigation expenses. In any case, as casual manipulation of the numbers in the ex-
ample above reveals, the basic qualitative result holds for a wide range of litigation costs. 
In Part I.F, I separately discuss those cases in which the amount that the plaintiff must 
be prepared to spend (relative to the stakes) is much smaller than the typical case de-
scribed here. 
 32 Most civil cases in federal court have lower stakes than this. According to a re-
cent survey, plaintiffs’ attorneys estimate that the median stakes in federal civil actions 
are $160,000. Emery G. Lee III and Thomas E. Willging, National, Case-Based Civil 
Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules *42 (Federal Judicial Center, Oct 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/FVU8-GNKG. 
For further discussion, see notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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have a 40 percent chance of winning this lawsuit?” can articulate 
facts that justify her belief in her case. Indeed, such a plaintiff 
would hardly expect to obtain a settlement without first articu-
lating to the defendant her basis for demanding relief. And 
although the courts have refused to articulate the plausibility 
standard in terms of percentages, a 40 percent chance of prevail-
ing is well above whatever numerical threshold one might as-
sign; a plaintiff with a 40 percent chance of winning hardly has 
an “implausible” case. 
Now we see why the presence or absence of a pleading 
standard will generally make little difference. A plaintiff with a 
low chance of prevailing will not bother to sue. And a plaintiff 
with a relatively strong shot at winning will already have in her 
possession probative, favorable, and articulable facts—that is, 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”33 At least in cases broadly representative of the bulk of fed-
eral civil litigation, there will be no difference between a regime of 
notice pleading, plausibility pleading, or no pleading standard, 
because even under no pleading standard, the only cases that 
will be filed will be cases in which the plaintiff pleads facts stat-
ing a plausible claim. And even if, in the absence of plausibility 
pleading, plaintiffs plead with less detail, those same plaintiffs 
would be able to respond to a plausibility pleading regime by 
pleading in greater detail—precisely because they would not be 
willing to sue (under any pleading regime) unless they had facts 
making their claims plausible in the first place. 
Of course, the example above, while perhaps representative of 
“typical” federal litigation, hardly captures all the scenarios that 
might arise. There are a number of factors that may complicate 
the analysis in important ways. I identify five sets of factors: 
(1) The role of lawyers and lawyering: Given that litigation 
is divided into stages and settlement often occurs early in 
litigation, a plaintiff may find it worthwhile to sue even if 
she is unwilling to spend the cost of taking the case all the 
way to trial. Further, many litigation decisions are made by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and many plaintiffs’ attorneys are com-
pensated on a contingency basis. Other plaintiffs may act 
pro se or benefit from subsidized legal fees or legal aid. 
These plaintiffs may have a very different cost-benefit calcu-
lus than plaintiffs paying their own way. 
 
 33 Twombly, 550 US at 570. 
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(2) Asymmetric information: Many cases involve asymmetric 
information, in which the defendant may know much more 
about the merits of the case than the plaintiff knows. 
Asymmetry of information lies at the heart of concerns over 
the “paradox of pleading.” 
(3) Spite, indignation, or optimism: Some plaintiffs may mis-
judge their chances in court due to irrational optimism, or 
they may not care about weighing costs and benefits but ra-
ther may simply want their day in court. 
(4) Nuisance suits: The analysis above assumes that the 
plaintiff’s expected payoff from litigation will be based on 
the expected judgment she would obtain in court. It is con-
ceivable, though, that a plaintiff might sue despite litigation 
costs that exceed her expected judgment, if the defendant 
would be willing to pay a sufficiently large nuisance settle-
ment—a settlement the defendant pays to avoid its litiga-
tion costs. 
(5) Shoot-the-moon cases: Some cases may have such high 
stakes that they are cost justified for the rational plaintiff 
even if ݌ is very small—so small that the facts used to justi-
fy the belief in ݌	would not be enough to survive a motion to 
dismiss in a regime with plausibility pleading.  
Below, I address these factors, distinguishing those that do not 
alter the results above from those that do. 
B. The Role of Lawyers and Lawyering 
So far, lawyers have been absent from the basic framework 
above. Considering the lawyer’s role requires two key adjust-
ments to this framework. First, lawyers play a large role in legal 
decisionmaking, and this may be true nowhere more so than 
with respect to a lawyer representing an individual plaintiff on a 
contingency basis. Most individual plaintiffs hire attorneys on a 
contingency basis, whereby the attorney covers the plaintiff’s lit-
igation costs and is repaid only if and when the plaintiff obtains 
a recovery. It is the attorney, not the plaintiff, who finances the 
litigation, and therefore it is the attorney, not the plaintiff, who 
decides whether a potential lawsuit would be cost justified. 
A plaintiffs’ attorney working on contingency must offset the 
entire cost of litigating every case with a fraction of the judg-
ments in the successful cases. This changes the calculus slightly, 
but it only magnifies the incentive to screen cases for quality 
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(that is, for high probability ݌ of winning), because the lawyer 
gets paid only if the plaintiff wins or obtains a settlement (both 
of which are more likely if the case is stronger). Indeed, an im-
portant study of the practice of contingency fee lawyers from the 
pre-Twombly era found that “[l]ack of liability alone accounts for 
the largest proportion of cases declined,” rather than reasons 
such as inadequate damages, the case being outside the lawyer’s 
area of practice, or others.34 
In terms of my model, if the decisionmaker is the plaintiffs’ 
attorney working on a contingency basis, the attorney must 
weigh the expected fees earned through litigation against the 
costs of bringing the suit. Indeed, given a limited budget of time 
and credit (for litigation expenses) that he can extend to his cli-
ents, an attorney working on contingency must concentrate his 
efforts on cases with the highest settlement value. The attorney 
receives a fraction, around 33 to 40 percent, of the plaintiff’s re-
covery as his fee.35 
The comparison for the plaintiffs’ attorney is therefore: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ݓ݅݊ ൈ ܨ݁݁ ൈ ܬݑ݀݃݉݁݊ݐ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ
൒ ܥ݋ݏݐ ݋݂ ݈݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
(4a) 
݌݂ܬ ൒ ܥ (4b) 
In this expression, ݂ is the attorney’s contingency fee. The left-
hand side is how much the plaintiffs’ attorney gets if the plaintiff 
wins, multiplied by the probability of winning. This must be 
greater than the right-hand side, which is how much the plain-
tiffs’ attorney has to pay to litigate the case, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff wins or loses. 
Second, lawyers litigate and negotiate for settlement in a 
dynamic setting. While it is a helpful simplification to assume 
that there is a single cost ܥ to litigating a case, the reality is that 
litigation occurs in stages, and costs accrue incrementally over 
time. This can have profound effects on settlement dynamics and 
the plaintiff’s willingness to sue.36 Most useful here are the in-
sights of Professor Bradford Cornell and Professors Joseph 
Grundfest and Peter Huang, who observe that the revelation of 
 
 34 Kritzer, 81 Judicature at 27 (cited in note 21).  
 35 Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics 
Walks, 65 Fordham L Rev 247, 248 (1996). 
 36 See William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 
22 J Legal Stud 99, 99–101 (1993). 
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information during the course of litigation creates “real options” 
for plaintiffs.37 A plaintiff need not weigh her expected judgment 
against the entire cost of litigating to judgment, because the 
plaintiff can abandon her claim (and thus avoid further litigation 
costs) if information revealed in discovery is unfavorable, and 
she will press ahead only if the information revealed is suffi-
ciently favorable. 
Given this, the plaintiff’s decision to sue—really the plain-
tiffs’ attorney’s decision to take the case—now has two compo-
nents. First, the plaintiff must determine whether, even if she 
files suit and the information revealed by discovery is favorable, 
the case is worth continuing at that point. To do this, the plain-
tiff compares the postdiscovery cost of litigation (call this ܿଶ, for 
the second phase of litigation) to the expected judgment condi-
tional on the information revealed in discovery being favorable 
(call this ݌ଶܬ, where ݌ଶ is the probability of winning in the event 
of good news). If the expected benefits outweigh the costs, the 
plaintiff will be willing to litigate—and the defendant, who also 
learns ݌ଶ through discovery, will be willing to pay ݌ଶܬ to settle. 
Thus, if discovery reveals good news, the plaintiff can expect to 
obtain ݌ଶܬ, no matter how unlikely good news is. And if discovery 
is unfavorable, the plaintiff can drop the case and cut her losses.38 
Second, the plaintiff must determine whether the case is 
worth bringing in the first place. To do this, the plaintiff com-
pares the cost of litigating through discovery (call this ܿଵ, for the 
first phase of litigation) to the expected recovery after discovery. 
From the discussion above, if the information revealed in discov-
ery is favorable, the plaintiff can obtain a settlement of ݌ଶܬ.39 
Call the plaintiff’s belief of the probability that discovery will re-
veal favorable information ݌ଵ. Thus, the ex ante probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail (what I have called ݌ so far) is ݌ ൌ 	݌ଵ݌ଶ 
(the probability of discovery revealing good news multiplied by 
the probability of winning in the event of good news), because if 
 
 37 See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J Legal 
Stud 173, 178–82 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest and Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of 
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 Stan L Rev 1267, 1272–75 (2006). 
 38 The reader will note that this discussion implicitly defines “bad news” to be news 
such that the case is not worth continuing. Of course, some cases may be so strong that 
the plaintiff never drops the case, even if discovery yields only unfavorable new infor-
mation. The analysis in the text would still hold in these cases, but one would simply 
have to set ݌ଵ ൌ 1. 
 39 Note that this settlement value assumes symmetry of costs. I discuss asymmetric 
costs in Part I.C.  
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the information is unfavorable, the plaintiff will just drop the 
case. The relevant comparisons for the decision to sue are now: 
 
݌ଶ݂ܬ ൒ ܿଶ (5a) 
݌݂ܬ ൒ ܿଵ (5b) 
 Expression 5a simply ensures that, in the event of favorable 
discovery, the plaintiff is willing to go to trial; if the plaintiff 
would drop the case even after favorable discovery, the plaintiff 
would never file suit in the first place, regardless of the pleading 
standard. Expression 5b is the crux, since it defines the thresh-
old below which the plaintiff (and her lawyer) is unwilling to sue, 
even given the benefit of the option value that discovery creates. 
To make this analysis concrete, I turn to a study by Emery 
Lee and Thomas Willging, who surveyed thousands of attorneys 
who had recently represented clients in federal civil cases about 
the nature of their cases and the costs they incurred in litigating 
them.40 This study represents the best (and nearly the only) data 
on litigation costs in a representative sample of recent federal 
civil cases. My objective here is to consider data not on how 
much a plaintiffs’ attorney must be prepared to pay to go to trial 
but rather on how much he can expect to pay to conduct discov-
ery and then settle a case. Not surprisingly, this latter number is 
far lower than the $100,000 figure used above. For surveyed 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, the median cost was $15,000,41 and the me-
dian case had stakes of $160,000.42 Plugging these values, as 
well as 33 percent for the contingency fee, into Expression 5b 
yields: 
   
݌	 ൈ 	0.33 ൈ 160,000 ൒ 15,000 (6a) 
݌ ൒ 0.284 (6b) 
Thus, we see that the basic qualitative results above—that the 
plaintiff will not file unless she believes the case to be relatively 
 
 40 See generally Lee and Willging, National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey (cited in 
note 32).  
 41 Id at *35. This is a conservative estimate of ܿଵ, given that this amount was the 
median litigation cost among plaintiffs who engaged in any discovery, whether it was 
completed or not. 
 42 Id at *42. 
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strong—remain unchanged.43 If a plaintiffs’ attorney will not 
take a case unless he has about a one-in-four chance of winning 
on the merits, then a complaint will not be filed unless the plain-
tiff has already convinced her attorney that her claim has a de-
cent shot of winning—but this already puts the plaintiff’s claim 
well past the threshold of plausibility.44 
Of course, the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys screen their cas-
es based on plausible merit is well understood. But the signifi-
cance of this fact has been overlooked by critics of Twombly and 
Iqbal. For example, in his influential article From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Professor Arthur Miller observes that 
rational plaintiffs’ attorneys are very cost- and time-
conscious. To avoid expenditures that may never be reim-
bursed and to prevent the loss of potentially more attractive 
alternative professional opportunities, they generally . . . 
screen potential cases using their own version of plausibility 
before taking on matters.45 
Yet Miller does not take the logical step that follows from this 
observation: plausibility pleading standards rarely affect which 
cases get filed, precisely because they generally do not impose a 
binding constraint on this decision. Plaintiffs’ attorneys set a 
higher bar than the courts. 
To be sure, the centrality of the plaintiffs’ attorney to most 
civil litigation suggests that the results above may not apply, or 
may not apply as strongly, when (1) expected litigation costs 
 
 43 Varying the contingency fee rate does not change the qualitative results. A 40 
percent contingency fee yields ݌	 ൒ 0.234. 
 44 Note that there may be situations in which the desire to signal case strength is 
overridden by other strategic considerations, such that the plaintiff will want to file a delib-
erately ambiguous or sparse pleading. See, for example, Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. 
Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views about Costs and Procedures in Federal Civil Litiga-
tion *29 (Federal Judicial Center, Mar 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/6SQU-VEDK 
(quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney stating that “[a]s a plaintiff I plead enough to tell the story 
but avoid pleading facts that might come back to haunt me”). What is important to note, 
however, is that here the withholding of detail is a strategic choice, rather than a reflec-
tion of a lack of information on the part of the plaintiff. (A true lack of information would 
be a reason for the plaintiffs’ attorney not to take the case.) Thus, the plaintiff could al-
ways survive a motion to dismiss through repleading with greater detail. Indeed, one of-
ten observes the dynamic of dismissal with leave to amend followed by repleading in 
greater detail. For some data on this, see generally Joe S. Cecil, et al, Update on Resolu-
tion of Rule 12(b)(6) Motions Granted with Leave to Amend: Report to the Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Federal Judicial Center, Nov 2011), archived 
at http://perma.cc/K6A6-D7RZ. 
 45 Miller, 60 Duke L J at 67 (cited in note 6). 
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relative to stakes are much lower than in the typical case or 
(2) plaintiffs’ attorneys are not exercising the gatekeeping func-
tion described above. This latter possibility could occur when 
there is no plaintiffs’ attorney, or when there is a plaintiffs’ at-
torney who is acting on an appointed or pro bono basis. Each of 
these two scenarios creates important exceptions to the general 
result presented above, so I discuss each of them in turn. 
First, the results above depend on a degree of rough propor-
tionality between expected litigation costs and the stakes of the 
case. As we saw above, even a ratio of stakes to cost of more than 
ten to one (that is, $160,000 to $15,000) is sufficient to ensure 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys set a threshold for predicted merit well 
above any reasonable threshold for plausibility. Nonetheless, not 
every claim will fit this pattern. There are cases for which the 
costs of litigation are unusually low relative to the stakes. Some-
times this may happen because there is unusually little discov-
ery to be done and the legal issues are especially simple, but 
much more often the reason is simply that there are high stakes. 
As Lee and Willging found in their survey, litigation costs tend 
to be roughly proportional to stakes, such that higher-stakes 
cases have higher expected litigation costs.46 But as stakes rise, 
expected litigation costs rise more slowly.47 Thus, as the stakes of 
a case get very large, litigation costs shrink relative to stakes. 
What this means is that for small- and medium-sized cases—
the cases with below, say, a half-million dollars at stake, which 
make up the great bulk of all civil litigation48—the calculations 
above apply. For a case with stakes of $50,000, the necessary 
probability of success (݌) might be above 50 percent; and for stakes 
above $250,000, ݌ might slip below 20 percent, but the basic logic 
holds.49 For larger-stakes cases, though, the result breaks down. 
 
 46 Emery G. Lee III and Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Feder-
al Civil Litigation, 60 Duke L J 765, 771–72, 788 (2010).  
 47 Lee and Willging found that, roughly speaking, if one doubles the stakes of a 
case, the cost of litigating that case rises by 25 percent, holding all other case character-
istics constant. Id at 771–72. 
 48 See, for example, Lee and Willging, National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey at 
*42 (cited in note 32) (noting that both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys estimated the 
median stakes of a case to be between $160,000 and $200,000). 
 49 To calculate these estimates, I use Lee and Willging’s estimate that a 100 percent 
change in stakes predicts a 25 percent change in the plaintiff ’s litigation costs, as well as 
their findings on the median values for stakes and litigation costs, to generate an equa-
tion that predicts litigation costs for any given level of stakes. Lee and Willging, 60 Duke L 
J at 771–72 (cited in note 46); Lee and Willging, National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey at 
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Litigation costs relative to stakes are much smaller for the highest-
stakes cases, and thus claims with a very low likelihood of suc-
cess—claims that might be deemed “implausible”—are cost-
effective to file. Because high-stakes cases are an important and 
highly salient subset of the federal docket, I address them in fur-
ther detail in Part I.F. 
Second, there may be no plaintiffs’ lawyer, or the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer may not be motivated by the cost-benefit calculation de-
scribed above. A pro se plaintiff may not have the same expertise 
at estimating the likelihood of success, and she will not measure 
litigation costs in terms of an attorney’s time. Further, the pro se 
plaintiff may have more-complex motivations than mere finan-
cial costs and benefits. (I discuss motivations such as indignation 
and spite below in Part I.D.) Because pro se plaintiffs are less 
likely to be reliable screeners based on predicted merit than at-
torneys are, plausibility pleading may have a bigger impact on 
claims brought by pro se plaintiffs.50 Even so, we should expect 
to see the screening process described above continue to function 
for many pro se cases. As the basic framework in Part I.A de-
scribes, a pro se plaintiff will weigh her personal costs in time 
and effort against the likely judgment in litigation. Of course, a 
pro se plaintiff may not do so as precisely as an attorney might, 
but the basic calculus is a familiar one to attorneys and nonat-
torneys alike. Indeed, many have had the experience of declining 
to pursue relief (even informal relief, without legal formalities) 
 
*42 (cited in note 32). Lee and Willging’s results are based on a log-log transformation (that 
is, they use the natural logarithms of both stakes and costs), so the equation is 
݈݊ሺcostsሻ ൌ ݈݊ሺߙሻ ൅ 	ߚ ln(stakes), 
where ߙ is the cost of litigating a case with zero stakes and ߚ ൌ 0.25 is the ratio between 
percent changes in stakes and percent changes in litigation costs. Plugging in the median 
values for costs and stakes, I can solve the equation, which yields ߙ ൌ 750. Thus, one can 
predict the litigation costs for any given stakes by solving the following equation: 
݈݊ሺcostsሻ ൌ ݈݊ሺ750ሻ ൅ 	0.25	 ݈݊ሺstakesሻ. 
This is a conservative estimate of the relationship between stakes and costs, because Lee 
and Willging estimate this relationship using an estimation specification that controls for 
various forms of litigation activity, which are endogenous to the stakes of the case (for 
example, higher-stakes cases are likely to involve more-extensive discovery). By treating 
litigation activity as independent from stakes, the influence on stakes is attenuated. In 
regressions that omit such factors (unreported results available from the author), the re-
lationship is somewhat stronger: a 100 percent change in stakes predicts a 43 percent 
change in the plaintiff ’s litigation costs. Under either estimate of the relationship be-
tween stakes and costs, though, the claims in the text hold. 
 50 Further, while some plaintiffs prefer to proceed pro se, some plaintiffs proceed on 
their own precisely because they were unable to find an attorney who was willing to rep-
resent them on a contingency basis. 
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against a clear-cut tort or breach of contract because the stakes 
at issue were too low to justify the hassle. This is no different in 
nature than the kind of calculation that a pro se plaintiff must 
confront when deciding whether to sue. 
Likewise, court-appointed attorneys and legal aid providers 
do not have the same incentives as private attorneys working for 
contingency fees. For this reason, their filing decisions may not 
conform to the patterns predicted above, and thus their clients 
may be more likely to be affected by pleading standards. Still, I 
should not overstate this difference. To the extent that attorneys 
working on a pro bono basis and legal aid providers are oversub-
scribed—and they usually are—one should again expect these 
attorneys to screen cases on plausible merit before filing. 
Whether an attorney’s motivation is maximizing profit or max-
imizing relief to deserving plaintiffs (or both), the incentive will 
be to select those cases with higher merit. 
C. Asymmetric Information 
As noted in the Introduction, the “paradox of pleading” is a 
widely raised argument in favor of notice pleading. Rakesh Kilaru 
puts it most succinctly: “Civil rights plaintiffs alleging motive-
based torts thus face a classic Catch-22: they cannot state a 
claim because they do not have access to documents or witnesses 
they believe exist; and they cannot get access to those documents 
or witnesses without stating a claim.”51 Perhaps because Conley 
and Iqbal were civil rights cases, this paradox is taken as uncon-
troversial.52 But it is crucial to note that everything in the discus-
sion above applies equally to cases with asymmetric information. 
The reason is that, even when there is no pleading standard, 
the plaintiff (or her attorney) will file suit only if it is worth the 
cost of litigating. And that determination depends on the facts 
known to the plaintiff at the time of filing. If the plaintiff does not 
have facts indicating that she has a decent claim, or at least facts 
showing a strong likelihood of uncovering favorable evidence in 
discovery (this is the “real option” value of litigation discussed 
 
 51 Kilaru, Comment, 62 Stan L Rev at 927 (cited in note 16). 
 52 See Miller, 60 Duke L J at 43–46 (cited in note 6); Steinman, 62 Stan L Rev at 
1311–12 (cited in note 4); Spencer, 49 BC L Rev at 481–83 (cited in note 4). Indeed, Miller 
notes, “[t]he problem was widely recognized at the Duke Conference [on civil litigation, 
May 10–11, 2010, sponsored by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules,] and no opposition was voiced to the need for solving the information-asymmetry 
problem.” Miller, 60 Duke L J at 105 n 404 (cited in note 6).  
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above),53 the plaintiff simply will not file suit. Asymmetry of in-
formation makes the plaintiff worse off, but this is true regardless 
of the pleading standard. The “paradox of pleading” has nothing 
to do with pleading; a more apt description would be the “tragedy 
of asymmetric information.” 
When a plaintiff (or plaintiffs’ lawyer) is deciding whether a 
case is worth filing, this decision is based on the information 
then available to the plaintiff. Some crucial facts, such as the de-
fendant’s motives, may be unknown to the plaintiff, of course. 
Given that crucial facts may be unknown but may be revealed 
by discovery, the plaintiff must rely on her estimates of the 
likelihood that favorable information about those unknown 
facts will come to light in discovery. If this likelihood is high 
enough, then it will be worthwhile to sue; if it is too low, the 
plaintiff will not sue. (This is simply the calculation already de-
scribed above in Part I.A–B.) But this estimate of how likely it is 
that discovery will reveal information favorable to the plaintiff’s 
case is itself dependent on the facts that the plaintiff currently 
knows. If those facts raise lots of red flags, her estimate of dis-
covery revealing favorable information will be higher. If those 
facts make the defendant look squeaky clean, then her estimate 
of discovery revealing favorable information will be lower. Thus, 
even in the presence of asymmetric information, a plaintiff’s de-
cision to sue will depend on her knowledge—before discovery—of 
facts indicating that her claim has a good chance of prevailing. 
And those facts—the ones known before discovery—are ex-
actly the facts that can be included in a pleading. Even if they 
are not facts that prove the plaintiff’s claim, they are facts that 
indicate that, by the time discovery is done, the plaintiff will 
have a strong case.54 Such facts, when pleaded in the plaintiff’s 
complaint, will more than suffice to state a plausible claim. 
For example, consider a large group of potential plaintiffs 
who might bring fairly typical employment discrimination claims 
in federal court. One might imagine the set of all midlevel em-
ployees who lost their jobs in a given time period. It is possible 
that any given one of them was fired for reasons related to inten-
tional discrimination, but it is also possible that any given one of 
them was fired for entirely separate reasons, such as poor indi-
vidual performance or downsizing by the employer. 
 
 53 See note 37 and accompanying text. 
 54 As noted above in Part I.B, a “strong case” in this context is one with maybe a 
one-in-four (or better) chance of winning. 
 2016] A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading 715 
 
Now assume, for the moment, that every plaintiff in this 
group has no information bearing on the defendant’s discrimina-
tory intent in her case. This set of plaintiffs is uniformly unin-
formed about the merits of their individual claims. In this situa-
tion, will every potential plaintiff in this group be willing to sue? 
As shown above, this depends on whether ݌ is at least about 25 
percent, once one accounts for the possibility that the plaintiff 
can drop the case if discovery yields unfavorable evidence. Of 
course, the true ݌ for this group is unknowable. In principle, it 
could be 1 percent, or 10 percent, or 99 percent. But remember 
that our concern is the paradox of pleading: we are assuming a 
set of plaintiffs who cannot articulate any facts explaining why 
they believe they were victims of discrimination. While no one 
knows what the probability is that a randomly chosen person 
who lost her job will be able to win a judgment on a claim that 
her employer intentionally discriminated against her, it seems 
doubtful that her chances of winning are one in four or better. If 
this is right, then a plaintiff will not be willing to sue when she 
has no facts tending to show that she, specifically, was the victim 
of discrimination. 
Thus, only a plaintiff who has probative, favorable facts 
about her claim will be willing to sue, even if there is no pleading 
standard. In some cases, the plaintiff knows that she was a 
hardworking employee who received positive evaluations from 
other supervisors. In some cases, the plaintiff knows that she 
was replaced by a worker who was not a member of her protect-
ed class. In some cases, the plaintiff heard discriminatory epi-
thets from her supervisors. And so on. The plaintiff has specific 
facts that are probative of discrimination, and thus she finds it 
worthwhile to sue. And because she wants a settlement from the 
defendant, it is her best strategy to plead those details, even if 
(as I have assumed throughout this Part) there is no pleading 
standard. 
Therein lies the flaw in the paradox of pleading. It begins 
with a plaintiff who believes that she has a meritorious case but 
who is unable to plead facts establishing the plausibility of her 
claim. This scenario begs the question of how it is that the plain-
tiff has formed her belief in the merits of her grievance. This be-
lief must come from something that the plaintiff, or someone 
known to the plaintiff, saw, heard, or experienced—in other 
words, it must come from facts. If so, then all the plaintiff needs 
to do is plead those facts that led her to conclude that her claim 
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was meritorious. The only paradox here is why someone with no 
facts indicating that she has a claim would nonetheless believe 
that she has a claim. 
To be clear: there are surely many potential plaintiffs who 
have been injured by the wrongdoing of a potential defendant, 
who have no facts suggesting this to them, but who nonetheless 
would, after full discovery, have a strong case and secure a large 
judgment on the merits. These plaintiffs, unfortunately, will not 
receive the judgment that the objective (but, before discovery, 
unknown) facts of their cases merit. But to be equally clear: this 
will happen even with no pleading standard. The bar to their re-
covery is not pleading. The bar is that it is simply not worth it to 
sue. The plaintiff (or her attorney) estimates a low ݌, even after 
accounting for the possibility that, because of asymmetric infor-
mation, discovery will reveal favorable facts that are currently 
obscured. 
The problem created by asymmetric information is not that 
judges cannot distinguish a plaintiff with a meritorious claim 
but no facts from a plaintiff with no claim at all; it is that these 
two plaintiffs cannot tell themselves apart. There is nothing that 
pleading rules can do to fix this. 
D. Spite, Indignation, and Optimism 
Plaintiffs do not always make coolheaded calculations about 
litigation costs and benefits when they feel they have been 
wronged. Some plaintiffs, seething over a perceived legal wrong, 
would throw my framework out the window and go to court re-
gardless of the costs. Other plaintiffs may weigh costs and bene-
fits, but bias or optimism may infect their calculations. 
These considerations surely temper the general results I 
have reached above, but these considerations themselves ought 
not to be overstated. First, as emphasized above, it is usually 
more realistic to treat the decisionmaker as the plaintiffs’ attor-
ney, who has the expertise, incentive, and emotional detachment 
to make decisions driven fundamentally by the calculus present-
ed above.55 
Second, even a steaming-mad plaintiff will still have a rea-
son why she is steaming mad. For pleading standards to affect 
whether this plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, it must be the 
case that the plaintiff is so indignant at a legal wrong that she is 
 
 55 See Part I.B. 
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willing to go to court regardless of the cost—and that she is nev-
ertheless unable to articulate facts that make her claim plausi-
ble. While such a scenario is not impossible, it borders on the 
fanciful.56 
Likewise, an overly optimistic plaintiff will have a reason 
why she is so optimistic. Her reasons for optimism provide her 
with a basis for pleading and settlement, regardless of the plead-
ing standard. Of course, there remains some subset of optimistic 
plaintiffs who are sufficiently unrealistic that the facts on which 
they base their optimism would fail under a plausibility pleading 
standard. These plaintiffs will be affected by the pleading standard. 
To recognize that these unduly optimistic plaintiffs will see 
their claims dismissed under a pleading standard, even if those 
claims would have survived under no pleading standard, is not 
to say that pleading standards necessarily make those plaintiffs 
worse off. Imagine an overly optimistic plaintiff who files suit 
because she believes that her likelihood of winning is high, when 
in fact the case is so weak that it will be dismissed under the 
plausibility pleading standard. This plaintiff files because she 
believes that the expected benefits of litigation outweigh the 
costs. Because she is wrong about this, she will lose money liti-
gating the case, even under no pleading standard. Having her 
case dismissed at the outset actually allows her to cut her losses. 
As I explain below in Part I.F, such plaintiffs are a subset of a 
larger set of plaintiffs who benefit from the plausibility pleading 
standard. 
E. Nuisance Suits 
A nuisance suit is a suit brought despite having negative ex-
pected value (that is, ݌ܬ ൏ ܥ or even ݌݂ܬ ൏ 	 ܿଵ) because the de-
fendant is willing to pay a settlement to avoid litigation costs. The 
idea here is that, so long as the plaintiff can credibly threaten to 
take the defendant to trial, the defendant will pay a settlement to 
the plaintiff even if the plaintiff would surely lose at trial, because 
the defendant wants to avoid the high cost of litigation. Concern 
about the in terrorem effect of litigation costs on settlement value 
was expressly cited by the majority in Twombly as motivation for 
 
 56 Of course, this hypothetical plaintiff ’s complaint may be dismissed anyway, if the 
facts constituting her grievance do not give rise to a legal claim. But this is legal insuffi-
ciency of the complaint, and Twombly and Iqbal did nothing to alter the requirement that 
complaints be legally sufficient (that is, that they allege a theory of wrongdoing that cre-
ates a basis for civil liability). Iqbal, 556 US at 679–80. 
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requiring plausible pleadings.57 Thus, consideration of nuisance 
litigation is necessary to complete the picture of when and how 
plausibility pleading standards might affect litigation.58 The 
analysis above, which assumes that plaintiffs sue only if the ex-
pected judgment exceeds their own costs, does not apply. Thus, I 
examine the nuisance-suit scenario in detail here. 
The linchpin of the nuisance settlement strategy is a credi-
ble claim that the plaintiff will follow through on her threat to 
take the case to trial if the defendant does not settle. The key ob-
stacle to this strategy is that the plaintiff’s threat is usually not 
credible: if the defendant refuses to pay a settlement, the plain-
tiff will simply drop the case, because the plaintiff will spend 
more on litigation costs than she can hope to recover at trial. A 
rich theoretical literature has examined the conditions under 
which a plaintiff can overcome this obstacle and successfully em-
ploy a nuisance settlement strategy.59 This literature generally 
predicts that asymmetry of litigation costs may lead to successful 
nuisance claims against defendants with relatively high litigation 
costs. Most relevant here, in recent formal game theory work, I 
identify conditions under which pleading becomes an integral 
part of a nuisance settlement strategy.60 Herein, I describe the 
literature that relates pleadings to nuisance suits and informally 
present the logic of how pleading and pleading standards affect 
nuisance litigation. 
It has long been recognized that litigation is a strategic 
game and that the burden and timing of litigation costs can fac-
tor into whether the parties settle and for how much. A canonical 
paper on this topic by Professors David Rosenberg and Steven 
Shavell gives the example of a plaintiff who can file (at minimal 
cost) a complaint, even though both the plaintiff and the defendant 
 
 57 Twombly, 550 US at 557–58. 
 58 Nonetheless, it is worth recognizing that because there are few, if any, objective 
measures of what makes a suit a nuisance suit, whether nuisance suits are in practice a 
significant phenomenon remains an open question. 
 59 For some of the seminal papers in this literature, see generally David C. Croson 
and Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 
Harv Neg L Rev 65 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory concerning the Credibility 
and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J Legal Stud 1 (1996); D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, A 
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3 
(1985). For a brief review of this literature, see William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to 
Force or Deter Settlement, 32 J L, Econ & Org *4–7 (forthcoming 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FJB8-EZEJ.  
 60 Hubbard, 32 J L, Econ & Org at *23–26 (cited in note 59). 
 2016] A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading 719 
 
know that the case has no merit.61 Their model predicts that the 
defendant will not litigate the case; instead, the defendant will 
settle with the plaintiff. This is because defending the case is 
costly, and since both the plaintiff and defendant know that the 
case is meritless, they will agree to a “nuisance settlement”—a 
positive amount that is lower than the defendant’s cost of de-
fending against the claim.62 
Professor Bone has applied this logic to pleading and motions 
to dismiss.63 Echoing Rosenberg and Shavell, he claims that the 
most a meritless suit could extract from a defendant is the de-
fendant’s cost of answering the complaint. His explanation is that 
once the complaint is answered, the plaintiff must expend addi-
tional resources to continue the lawsuit; if the suit is meritless, 
the plaintiff will not do so.64 By this logic, meritless suits will be 
rare. Because “answering is seldom more costly than filing, the 
model predicts that few frivolous plaintiffs will find it worth-
while to sue.”65 
Given this model of pleading and settlement, it seems that 
the problem of frivolous litigation that so preoccupied the 
Twombly Court is unlikely to be very costly to defendants, as-
suming that frivolous litigation happens at all. But this model of 
pleading and settlement understates the relevance of discovery 
costs to settlement. So long as the plaintiff’s costs of conducting 
discovery are less than the defendant’s costs, the plaintiff can re-
fuse the nuisance settlement predicted by Rosenberg, Shavell, 
and Bone; force the defendant to file an answer; and then initi-
ate discovery, at which point the defendant is willing to settle—
but this time, for any amount less than the cost of complying 
with the obligations of discovery. 
This is not a trivial difference. The cost of copying each para-
graph of the plaintiff’s complaint and then inserting the word “de-
nied” beneath each one may not give a wealthy defendant pause; 
but the cost of preserving, collecting, reviewing, and producing 
 
 61 Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 4–5 (cited in note 59). 
 62 Id at 4. 
 63 See generally Bone, 94 Iowa L Rev 873 (cited in note 22). Rosenberg and Shavell’s 
model is sufficiently abstract that the “cost of defense” to which they refer could include 
all or some of the costs of a motion to dismiss, an answer, or discovery. Rosenberg and 
Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 4–5 (cited in note 59). 
 64 Bone, 94 Iowa L Rev at 921 & n 202 (cited in note 22). 
 65 Robert G. Bone, Civil Procedure: The Economics of Civil Procedure § 4.4.1 at 150 
(Foundation 2003). 
 720  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:693 
   
millions of pages of records and terabytes or petabytes of elec-
tronically stored information will. 
In order for this strategy to succeed, however, the plaintiffs’ 
attorney must ensure that the plaintiff’s threat to pursue dis-
covery after the defendant files an answer is credible. To do this, 
the plaintiff must make pursuing discovery after the defendant 
answers as costless as possible for herself. If she does not, the 
plaintiff’s threat to impose discovery costs on the defendant be-
comes less credible, because following through on the threat re-
quires expenditures by the plaintiff as well. 
For this reason, the timing of litigation expenses affects the 
credibility of threats to pursue litigation, and plaintiffs have an 
incentive to front-load discovery costs. By gathering all infor-
mation and evidence from the plaintiff before the case is filed, the 
plaintiffs’ attorney turns all of the plaintiff’s costs of discovery 
into sunk costs.66 By the time the defendant files its answer, the 
plaintiff faces fewer additional costs if she moves forward with 
discovery.67 
The only challenge that remains for the plaintiffs’ attorney 
in executing this strategy is to credibly communicate to the de-
fendant that the plaintiff’s costs of discovery have already been 
sunk. This is a challenge because every plaintiffs’ lawyer will 
have an incentive to claim that this is true to gain an advantage 
in settlement negotiations. In other words, the plaintiff has to 
show that her assertion that she has already sunk discovery 
costs is not merely cheap talk. It is here that detailed pleading 
becomes useful. It serves as a device to credibly and verifiably 
signal that the plaintiff has sunk her discovery costs. 
At this point, one may wonder how a plaintiff with a low-
merit or meritless claim can expend costs on detailed pleading. It 
 
 66 Of course, this strategy of sinking costs will not work for every potential plaintiff. 
It may cost the plaintiff more in sunk costs required to execute this strategy than she can 
recover in a nuisance settlement. If so, there will be no complaint filed and no settlement. 
But as I show in another article, there is a potentially large set of disputes for which a 
cost-sinking strategy will generate a settlement that exceeds the plaintiff ’s sunk costs. 
See Hubbard, 32 J L, Econ & Org at *10–20 (cited in note 59). 
 67 Id at *9, 27. In litigation, it will often be the case that it is much easier for the 
plaintiff to gather new evidence during discovery, when the plaintiff can compel produc-
tion from the defendant, than in advance of litigation. But note that in the scenario de-
scribed here, the plaintiff is not seeking to discover information from the defendant in the 
prelitigation period. Rather, the plaintiff is sinking the costs of her own production, as 
well as the costs of developing legal theories and the like. In a nuisance suit, the plaintiff 
has no desire prior to litigation to gather information in the possession of the defendant. By 
assumption, the (lack of) merit of the claim is already common knowledge to the parties. 
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is worth noting that—at least in the absence of a plausibility 
pleading standard—detailed pleadings need not contain allega-
tions that, if true, tend to prove the plaintiff’s case. Instead, the 
plaintiff needs to ensure only that the details in the complaint 
credibly reflect the expenditure of effort that otherwise would 
have to occur after the complaint was filed. In this respect, doc-
umenting a failed investigation works as well as documenting a 
successful one. If this sounds far-fetched, it may be. But perhaps, 
at least to the eyes of seven Supreme Court justices, this is ex-
actly what the complaint in Twombly did.68 
Nonetheless, whether the plaintiff’s complaint details a suc-
cessful or a failed investigation is relevant to one thing: a motion 
to dismiss. So far in this Part, I have assumed there is no plead-
ing standard, but here we see a case in which a requirement of 
plausibility pleading may have bite. If the suit is totally merit-
less or extremely weak, the complaint may not survive a motion 
to dismiss under a plausibility pleading standard. The best the 
plaintiff can do is a true “nuisance settlement” in the sense de-
scribed by Bone.69 But in cases that have some (or even great) 
merit, the plaintiffs’ attorney can still use the costs of discovery 
to negotiate a more favorable settlement. Thus, even in a case of 
limited merit, a plaintiffs’ attorney may want to invest in a 
strong pleading if the defendant’s costs of discovery are likely to 
be very high.70 
It is important here to note that this same argument does 
not apply to detailed answers to pleadings. Given the argument 
above, a reader may wonder why, if detailed pleading is so ad-
vantageous, defendants almost never answer in detail.71 The rea-
son is that a defendant stands to gain nothing from detailed 
pleading in a nuisance suit. The point of detailed pleading in 
 
 68 See generally Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Twombly v Bell 
Atlantic Corp, Civil Action No 02-10220 (SDNY filed Apr 14, 2003) (available on Westlaw 
at 2003 WL 25629874) (containing twenty-nine pages of allegations in ninety-six num-
bered paragraphs, with ninety-four of the paragraphs “based upon . . . the investigation 
of counsel”).   
 69 See Bone, 94 Iowa L Rev at 920–22 (cited in note 22). 
 70 Note that this argument applies only to nuisance suits brought to exploit high 
litigation costs of the defendant. Parties may bring nuisance litigation for reasons unre-
lated to the defendant’s litigation costs. For example, the “fishing expedition” lawsuit 
seeks relief not for its (pretextual) claims but rather for the purpose of uncovering evi-
dence that could justify additional (potentially meritorious) lawsuits. 
 71 See Picker, 2007 S Ct Rev at 175 (cited in note 27) (“As a look at any recently 
filed answer makes clear, we know how the defendant is going to answer: the defendant 
is simply going to deny the allegation.”).  
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nuisance litigation is to document the expenditure of one’s litiga-
tion costs—but the defendant’s primary objective in a nuisance 
suit is avoiding its litigation costs. Indeed, a nuisance suit is 
filed precisely because the defendant would rather settle than 
sink the costs of litigation. 
In short, a nuisance suit will have settlement value only if 
the plaintiff’s threat to impose discovery costs on the defendant 
is credible. By front-loading her own discovery costs, the plaintiff 
can credibly threaten to impose burdensome discovery demands 
on the defendant, undeterred by the prospect of her own costs of 
responding to discovery. This precomplaint investigation will 
manifest itself in detailed pleading, even when there is no plead-
ing standard. 
Thus, the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on this category of 
cases is more subtle than is commonly understood. As detailed 
pleading was the norm long before Twombly,72 we should not ex-
pect Twombly and Iqbal to change the presence or quantity of 
detail in pleadings—even in nuisance suits! But Twombly and 
Iqbal do not necessarily require detailed pleading; they require 
plausible pleading. What does this mean in the context of nui-
sance litigation? 
For some types of cases, even plaintiffs bringing nuisance 
suits can draft plausible complaints. Imagine an employment 
discrimination complaint that alleges that the plaintiff is a 
member of a protected class, that the plaintiff was fired while 
other employees—all white males under the age of forty—were 
not fired, and that the plaintiff was replaced by a white male 
under the age of forty whose résumé and experience were weaker 
than the plaintiff’s. These allegations could be brought by a plain-
tiff with an overwhelmingly strong case, or they could be brought 
by a plaintiff who is certain to lose—perhaps because other facts 
(the plaintiff’s gross incompetence, mistreatment of coworkers, 
and so on) need not have been included in the complaint. 
For other types of cases, though, the plausibility requirement 
may have teeth. Perhaps elaborate antitrust claims such as those 
brought in Twombly itself fall into this category. Precisely because 
the plaintiff’s theory of the case is fairly complex, plausibility re-
quires a degree of factual detail that may be impossible for the 
plaintiff seeking a nuisance settlement to allege (given that, in 
 
 72 See Cooper, 46 Wake Forest L Rev at 946–47 (cited in note 7) (noting that since 
1983, the threat of FRCP 11 sanctions has led lawyers to plead with greater specificity). 
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order for the claim to be a nuisance claim, the facts forming the 
basis of the plaintiff’s case must be weak). 
It is also worth noting that not every case involving a nui-
sance settlement strategy will have a detailed pleading. If a 
plaintiff’s costs of discovery are likely to be very low, then the 
plaintiff does not need to put much detail into her complaint in 
order to have a credible threat to move forward with discovery. A 
specific example of this would be cases bringing “inventory 
claims”—highly similar claims by many individual plaintiffs, 
some of which are meritorious and many of which are not.73 In 
these circumstances, if discovery costs are relatively low for 
plaintiffs, it may be more cost-effective for a plaintiffs’ attorney 
simply to file boilerplate complaints for the entire “inventory” 
than to engage in screening on merit before the fact. In this sce-
nario, some settlements might be nuisance settlements, while 
other settlements would reflect meritorious claims. For such 
claims, the pleadings may lack detail—or, even if rich in detail, 
may lack details that are specific to the plaintiffs—and as such, 
the complaints may be close to the line of plausibility.74 These 
types of cases, too, may be affected by the plausibility pleading 
standard. 
F. Class Actions and Shoot-the-Moon Cases 
For the vast majority of claims, plaintiffs (or their attorneys) 
will not file suit unless they assess their claims to be fairly strong. 
But this argument depends on the empirical assumption that for 
most claims, the cost of litigation is sufficiently high relative to 
the stakes of the case to give a plaintiff (or her lawyer) pause be-
fore filing suit. As shown above, the cost of litigating (at least 
through discovery) is usually tens of thousands or hundreds of 
 
 73 Anecdotally, some types of asbestos litigation have been described this way, as have 
certain types of cases involving relatively small claims for fixed statutory damages, such as 
claims brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 
(1977), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1692 et seq. See, for example, Amchem Products, 
Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 600–01 (1997) (noting that the parties referred to one group of 
plaintiffs with pending asbestos claims as inventory plaintiffs). 
 74 For example, a products liability complaint for personal injury from exposure to 
asbestos may contain considerable detail about the history of the asbestos industry, de-
tails of the industry’s alleged wrongdoing, and medical evidence of the effects of asbestos 
on human health—all of which are alleged identically across countless individual com-
plaints—but relatively little factual detail on the nature of how the plaintiff ’s current 
health problems were caused by asbestos. Nonetheless, one might argue that so long as 
there is some allegation of exposure to asbestos, it would be hard to call such a complaint 
implausible. 
 724  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:693 
   
thousands of dollars, and the cost of litigation scales roughly 
proportionally with the stakes of litigation.75 But as one looks 
across the spectrum of cases, as the stakes start to rise, the costs 
of litigation do not rise as quickly, and therefore cases with the 
highest stakes tend to have litigation costs that are much small-
er relative to their stakes. 
For high-stakes individual claims, this means that the gate-
keeping function of plaintiffs’ attorneys may disappear—it may 
be worth suing under no pleading standard, even though the 
likelihood of winning is very low and the facts known to the 
plaintiff, if alleged in the complaint, would not amount to a plau-
sible claim. For example, if stakes are $1 billion and expected 
costs are a hefty but not proportionately large $1 million, then 
from Expression 5b we have:  
   
0.33	݌	ሺ1,000,000,000ሻ ൒ 1,000,000 (7a) 
݌ ൒ 0.003 (7b) 
In other words, if the stakes are high enough, a plaintiff may be 
willing to accept lottery-ticket odds. Because such claims may 
not be plausible, the choice of pleading standard may affect these 
claims. 
Most of the cases with the highest stakes, though, are not 
individual actions but class actions. While the principles dis-
cussed above apply to class actions as well as individual actions, 
the nature of class actions as large and sometimes-complex ag-
gregations of many individual claims makes class actions 
uniquely sensitive to pleading standards. As I explain, litigating 
a class action can simultaneously be both too expensive and too 
inexpensive for the normal gatekeeping function of plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to operate as it does in the mine-run of cases. 
One of the virtues of the class action device is that by aggre-
gating many similar claims, a single action can economize on lit-
igation costs relative to the alternative of each class member 
bringing an individual claim.76 Indeed, the prototypical class ac-
tion involves claims that plaintiffs would not bring individually 
(because the cost of litigating an individual claim outweighs the 
expected judgment) but that plaintiffs would find economically 
feasible to litigate on a class basis. 
 
 75 See Part I.B. 
 76 See Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 Colum L Rev 1554, 1554 (1968). 
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The potential efficiencies from litigation on a class basis also 
ensure that a larger share of the total amount recovered in a suc-
cessful class action goes to the plaintiff class, rather than to the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. As noted above, in an individual action, a 
plaintiffs’ attorney will earn a contingency fee of 33 to 40 percent 
of the total recovery, while in a class action, attorney’s fees are set 
by the court, or, if the case is settled (as it usually is), the parties 
may negotiate attorney’s fees as a separate part of the settlement, 
subject to judicial approval.77 Because of the economies of scale in 
class action litigation, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in successful class 
actions can be well compensated for far less than 33 to 40 percent 
of the total recovery. 
Thus, relative to the total stakes of the class action, and rel-
ative to the total cost of class members litigating individual 
suits, the costs for a plaintiffs’ attorney to litigate a class action 
are low. These economies of scale have a profound effect on the 
incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys to act as gatekeepers in class ac-
tion litigation. Because the stakes are so high relative to the costs, 
litigation may be cost justified even if the factual basis for the 
claim is very weak and the plaintiffs’ expected likelihood of suc-
cess is very low. If we translate the calculations for individual 
suits to the class action context, we can again take the hypothet-
ical $1 billion stakes and $1 million in litigation costs for the 
plaintiff class, but adjust the contingency fee to reflect the effi-
ciencies of class litigation. For example, let’s consider a 10 percent 
fee, rather than a 33 percent fee: 
 
0.10	݌	ሺ1,000,000,000ሻ ൒ 1,000,000 (8a) 
݌ ൒ 0.01 (8b) 
While this is a slightly higher bar than the likelihood-of-success 
cutoff for individual litigation in Expression 7b, a 1 percent 
chance of success is hardly screening for case quality! And in any 
event, if the facts known to the plaintiffs give them only a 1 per-
cent chance of success on the merits, such facts probably would 
not meet a plausibility pleading standard. 
Of course, plaintiffs’ attorneys might not be compensated on a 
percentage basis in a class action. Instead, the court’s fee award 
 
 77 See FRCP 23(e) (requiring that class action settlements be approved by the 
court); FRCP 23(h) (providing that a court may award attorney’s fees in a certified class 
action).  
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or the parties’ negotiated settlement could simply reimburse the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys for the full value of their time—based on an 
appropriate hourly rate—and inflate this amount by a multiplier 
reflecting the ex ante risk that the plaintiffs’ attorneys would re-
cover nothing.78 This approach, though, leads to even less gate-
keeping by plaintiffs’ attorneys, because it guarantees that, ex 
ante, the fee award will cover the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ litigation 
costs: a low probability of prevailing is compensated by a higher 
fee award, so there is no need to avoid long shot cases. Thus, class 
actions create the same incentive as high-stakes individual ac-
tions: plaintiffs’ attorneys would find it rational to pursue a shoot-
the-moon strategy with long odds claims, at least in the absence of 
a pleading standard. 
The defendant may enjoy economies from aggregation as 
well. But the logic of the shoot-the-moon claim does not depend 
on the defendant’s litigation costs being high or low. Rather, the 
tendency of the class action device to facilitate a shoot-the-moon 
dynamic is a product of the potentially massive economies of 
scale that it provides for plaintiffs. 
Nonetheless, the costs of defending a class action are rele-
vant to pleading strategy, albeit for a different reason. As noted 
above in Part I.E, a nuisance claim’s success depends on an 
asymmetry of litigation costs between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. While a shoot-the-moon strategy depends on the plain-
tiff’s litigation costs relative to the stakes, a nuisance settlement 
strategy depends on the plaintiff’s litigation costs relative to the 
defendant’s litigation costs. Importantly, the class action device 
not only lowers the plaintiff class’s costs relative to the total 
stakes; it also lowers the plaintiff class’s costs relative to the de-
fendant’s costs. This is precisely because it is the plaintiffs’ side 
of the litigation that is being consolidated into a single litigation 
effort.79 Further, it is essential to recognize that the efficiencies 
 
 78 This is the prevalent approach that courts take. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do 
Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U Pa L Rev 2043, 2050–56 (2010) (describing 
the lodestar method and its application in class action cases). 
 79 This is part of the normative justification for class actions. Even in the absence of 
a class action, a defendant can consolidate its litigation efforts across individual cases 
much more easily than individual plaintiffs can coordinate their litigation expenses. See, 
for example, David Rosenberg and Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and 
the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J Legal Analysis 305, 305–10 (2014). Nonetheless, 
such efficiencies should not be overstated; sophisticated plaintiffs’ attorneys often share dis-
covery and coordinate litigation activity in related cases. See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, 
Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshold to Class Actions, 81 
U Cin L Rev 1225, 1245 (2013). 
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of the class action device are lower costs on a per-plaintiff basis; 
the costs of a single class action are higher—sometimes astro-
nomically higher—than the costs of a single individual action, 
and the costs are higher for both the plaintiffs’ lawyers and the 
defense lawyers. 
In an important sense, therefore, the class action device 
makes litigation too expensive for the normal gatekeeping func-
tion of plaintiffs’ lawyers to operate in some cases. By raising de-
fense costs, and raising them relative to plaintiff’s costs, class 
action aggregation can make viable a nuisance settlement strat-
egy that would not work in the individual action context. 
In this way, both Twombly and its critics are right: class ac-
tions (and in particular antitrust class actions) can make litiga-
tion very expensive in absolute terms, as the Court in Twombly 
emphasized,80 but a properly constituted class action is, by de-
sign, more efficient and less expensive to litigate relative to indi-
vidual actions.81 With respect to claims that, to the plaintiffs’ at-
torney drafting the complaint, have a good shot on the merits, 
the class action device interacts with pleading practice in a be-
nign or even beneficial way. Pleading standards are irrelevant, 
because the plaintiff can and will (for all the reasons given above 
in Part I.A) allege the facts that form the basis of her claim, and 
the efficiencies of the class action ensure that plausible claims 
are not deterred by high litigation costs for the plaintiff. 
But with respect to claims that the plaintiffs’ attorney rec-
ognizes to be long shot claims, the class action device creates in-
centives that require pleading standards to perform a gatekeep-
ing function usually reserved for plaintiffs’ attorneys. By raising 
defense costs both in dollar terms and relative to plaintiffs’ costs, 
low-merit claims may become viable bases for nuisance settle-
ments. And by lowering plaintiffs’ costs relative to the stakes, a 
class action can make a long shot claim cost justified, even if it 
lacks nuisance value. And of course, both of these effects can 
manifest themselves in the same class action. 
What immediately follows from this conclusion is that if 
pleading standards are likely to have an effect as a descriptive 
matter, and if plausibility pleading is likely to be desirable as a 
normative matter, this will be true in the class action context if 
it is true anywhere. It should not be surprising, therefore, that 
 
 80 Twombly, 550 US at 558. 
 81 See Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litiga-
tion in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1997, 2038 (2010). 
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Twombly and Iqbal—the Supreme Court’s two interventions to 
install the doctrine of plausibility pleading—were large, high-
stakes class actions with massively asymmetrical litigation 
costs.82 And conversely, it should not be surprising that in more-
routine pleading cases since Twombly, the Court has shown no 
interest in expanding the gatekeeping function of the courts. Er-
ickson v Pardus,83 decided only weeks after Twombly, reversed 
the dismissal of a complaint filed by an individual pro se prison-
er alleging mistreatment of his medical conditions.84 Johnson v 
City of Shelby, Mississippi,85 the Court’s most recent word on 
plausibility pleading, was a per curiam reversal of the dismissal 
of a complaint filed by two individual police officers who alleged 
they were fired for whistle-blowing activity.86 
* * * 
In sum, the thought experiment of a world with no pleading 
standard yields the conclusion that, in general, cases that would 
not be filed (or that would be dismissed) under a pleading stand-
ard would not be filed even in the absence of a pleading stand-
ard, and complaints that are pleaded with factual detail under a 
pleading standard would be pleaded with factual detail even in 
the absence of a pleading standard. This is because the econom-
ics of litigation are such that it is generally not worth suing un-
less one believes that the claim has a decent shot (maybe one in 
four) of prevailing. To form such a belief, though, one must al-
ready have articulable facts in mind. And if so, pleading these 
facts facilitates settlement, even if there is no risk of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
This basic logic, however, has its limits, and understanding 
these limits helps sharpen the descriptive and normative contents 
 
 82 When I teach Twombly to my Civil Procedure students, we work through a rough 
calculation of the stakes in that case. Given that the putative class included all US 
households with phone or Internet service during the period from February 1996 through 
December 2003, this includes approximately 180 million households over 95 months. See 
FCC Releases Study on Telephone Trends *1-1, 8-3 (FCC, May 22, 2002), archived at 
http://perma.cc/T848-W29F. Given that damages under the Sherman Act are trebled, a 
$20 monthly overcharge per household due to the alleged conspiracy implies total dam-
ages exceeding $1 trillion. This is more than 8 percent of the entire US gross domestic 
product in 2003, the year that the case was filed. Even a two-cent monthly overcharge 
implies damages to the class exceeding $1 billion. 
 83 551 US 89 (2007). 
 84 Id at 89–90.  
 85 135 S Ct 346 (2014). 
 86 Id at 346–47. 
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of this analysis. As I show above, there are several factors that 
(perhaps surprisingly) do not affect the analysis: 
(1) Contingency fee arrangements: The widespread use of 
contingency fees by plaintiffs’ attorneys reinforces the basic 
analysis. Because plaintiffs’ attorneys’ compensation is a 
fraction of the settlement obtained, a plaintiffs’ attorney will 
take a case only if it is relatively valuable when compared to 
the attorney’s expected litigation costs. 
(2) Staging of litigation costs: The fact that litigation pro-
ceeds in stages, and thus that the costs of litigation arise 
piecemeal, allows plaintiffs with relatively lower–expected 
value claims to bring suit. This effect for a typical real-life 
case, however, does not induce plaintiffs without plausible 
(however sensibly defined) claims to file in the absence of a 
pleading standard. 
(3) Asymmetric information: Contrary to the popular view 
that heightened pleading standards create a paradox of 
pleading, pleading standards do not have any special effect 
when asymmetry of information favors the defendant.  
There are other factors, though, that do undermine the pre-
diction that pleading standards will not affect the decision to file 
or the decision to plead in detail: 
(1) Plaintiffs who do not pay litigation costs: A pro se plain-
tiff with a very low opportunity cost of her time, or a plain-
tiff represented by an attorney acting pro bono, may be will-
ing to bring suit even when unable to articulate facts 
explaining why the claim may have merit. Pleading stand-
ards may therefore affect such plaintiffs. Note, though, that 
to the extent that a provider of pro bono legal services is 
oversubscribed or otherwise resource constrained, the pro-
vider will tend to focus its attention on the strongest cases, 
thereby replicating the screening effect predicted by my 
analysis. 
(2) Plaintiffs motivated by spite, indignation, or optimism: 
While their attorneys will often succeed at tempering their 
zeal, some plaintiffs may insist on filing suit even when they 
cannot articulate why they believe that they have a decent 
claim. Outcomes for these plaintiffs could be affected by 
pleading standards. 
(3) Some nuisance suits: Some low-merit nuisance litigation 
may be discouraged by higher pleading standards. While 
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most low-merit nuisance claims will not be brought, even 
under no pleading standard, claims in which litigation costs 
are highly asymmetric and favor the plaintiff may be viable 
in the absence of a pleading standard. 
(4) Class actions and shoot-the-moon claims: Related to low-
merit cases with high litigation costs for the defendants are 
low-merit cases with extremely high stakes. These shoot-
the-moon claims may be viable under no pleading standard 
but could be affected by a pleading standard. Class actions 
may be particularly susceptible to this dynamic, as the cost 
economies and aggregation of stakes due to the class action 
device may make plaintiffs’ litigation costs a tiny fraction of 
the stakes. 
The general result that pleading standards will make little 
difference, as well as the qualifications to the scope of this result, 
generates several empirical predictions and may inform our 
normative assessment of pleading rules as well. Before turning 
to these predictions, however, I briefly consider how judicial be-
havior may respond to the phenomenon of case screening and de-
tailed pleading that occurs regardless of the pleading standard. 
II.  JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF PLEADING 
So far, I have argued that detailed pleading will arise even 
in a regime of no pleading standard. The goal of this thought ex-
periment is to shed light on actual pleading practice in a world 
in which defendants can file motions to dismiss and judges can 
dismiss cases for failure to state a claim. So I now consider how 
screening of case quality by the plaintiff and the use of pleading 
detail as a signal to the defendant interact with the third actor 
in the courtroom: the judge. 
Because of incentives to screen merit and signal case quali-
ty, plaintiffs will tend to file detailed factual pleadings regard-
less of the pleading standard. Thus, long before Twombly and 
plausibility pleading came along, federal court judges saw de-
tailed pleadings in most cases. This meant not only that few 
complaints would be susceptible to motions to dismiss but also 
that the few complaints that lacked factual detail would appear 
exceptional in their lack of detail. Because lack of factual detail 
in a complaint was exceptional, judges would take note of com-
plaints lacking facts and draw inferences about their claims. 
From a sparse complaint, a judge could infer that the plaintiff 
lacked favorable facts and could conclude that the case was 
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exceedingly weak, at least relative to the large numbers of cases 
with detailed pleadings. If so, a judge would be tempted to save 
the court’s and the parties’ time by disposing of the case at the 
outset. 
Take a hypothetical district court judge in the pre-Twombly 
era. This judge has no particular ideological agenda but under-
stands that she operates in a liberal notice pleading regime. The 
overwhelming majority of civil complaints that she sees contain 
factual details, and many complaints are long—sometimes tedi-
ously long—recitations of the facts of the dispute, with particular 
emphasis on the facts that tend to prove the plaintiff’s case.87 
Now imagine that a complaint is filed in this judge’s court 
alleging an employment discrimination claim. This complaint of-
fers nothing more than the identities of the plaintiff and defend-
ant, the required jurisdictional allegations, a demand for relief, 
and the following statement: “I was turned down for a job be-
cause of my race.” When the judge reads this complaint, what 
will her reaction be? Probably skepticism. All other plaintiffs in 
this kind of case—even the ones who end up losing—provide 
some indication in their complaints of why or how the denial of 
employment was because of race. Perhaps they describe how 
they were highly qualified for the job, how their employers hired 
white applicants instead, or how the hired applicants were less 
qualified. Perhaps they allege comments about race made by 
human resources personnel or provide accounts of other minori-
ties who were treated poorly by the defendant. But this plaintiff? 
Nothing. 
Given that this judge lives in a world in which detailed fac-
tual pleading is the norm, she will draw a negative inference. 
Even plaintiffs with poor cases, she will reason, can muster some 
evidence of discrimination in their complaints. If this plaintiffs’ 
attorney cannot state one fact suggesting race discrimination, 
the judge might wonder, why is this complaint worth months or 
years of the court’s time? 
Of course, the judge might not grant a motion to dismiss the 
complaint. But the judge might. And this is the interesting part, 
because “‘I was turned down for a job because of my race’ is all a 
 
 87 For examples of judicial criticisms of long-winded complaints, see American 
Nurses’ Association v Illinois, 783 F2d 716, 724 (7th Cir 1986) (“The pleading of facts is 
well illustrated by the present case. The complaint is twenty pages long and has a hun-
dred page appendix.”); Decker v Massey-Ferguson, Ltd, 681 F2d 111, 114 (2d Cir 1982) 
(bemoaning the “prolix and discursive 69 page complaint”). 
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complaint has to say” to state a Title VII claim for racial discrim-
ination.88 A complaint will say much more than it has to say. 
And if judges see detailed pleading all the time, it is natural that 
they will come to expect it. 
In short, if nearly all plaintiffs have an incentive to plead in 
detail, judges—even judges hearing cases under a notice plead-
ing standard—will (accurately) perceive factually detailed plead-
ing as the norm. Sparsely pleaded complaints will appear aber-
rant and suspect, leading judges to (accurately) infer that the 
claims raised by those complaints are relatively weak. Given this 
dynamic, the desire of judges to control their caseloads and weed 
out weaker cases will create constant pressure to dismiss the ra-
re complaint that gives the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s 
claim but that raises an implausible claim. 
If so, then the practical difference between notice pleading 
and plausibility pleading becomes even narrower, and this is 
true even for those types of cases that are exceptions to the basic 
framework, as noted above in Part I. Judges accustomed to de-
tailed pleadings would look skeptically upon pleadings by pro se 
plaintiffs, or pleadings in cases with shoot-the-moon stakes, that 
lacked factual detail. And their skepticism would be justified; 
although the economic logic of these cases would mean that it 
was rational to file suit under a low pleading standard, it would 
remain the case that these claims, by definition, lacked articula-
ble facts that gave the plaintiff reason to think the claim had a 
decent shot at success. And if judges not only were skeptical of 
such complaints but in fact dismissed them notwithstanding 
that they gave notice to the defendants, then something like a 
plausibility pleading standard would have emerged endogenous-
ly from the behavior of plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys long 
before Twombly. 
III.  SOME EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE THEORY 
My central thesis in this Article is that, in general, pleading 
rules will not operate as binding constraints on litigant behavior, 
because other considerations—litigation cost, the need to signal 
case strength in order to obtain settlement—operate as stricter 
screens. Importantly, this claim is essentially an empirical one. 
In this Part, I describe some empirical implications of this theory 
of pleading and provide some evidence corroborating these 
 
 88 Bennett v Schmidt, 153 F3d 516, 518 (7th Cir 1998) (Easterbrook).  
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predictions. To be clear, this evidence is impressionistic and 
merely suggestive. Ultimately, these predictions will have to be 
tested against the results of the growing quantitative literature 
on pleading. My hope is that the predictions and evidence herein 
will inform future empirical studies of pleading. 
A. Everything New Is Old Again 
At the most basic level, this theory is summarized by the old 
cliché that the more things change, the more they stay the same. 
The most fundamental empirical prediction of this theory is that 
even in a world with pleading standards, dismissals for failure to 
state a claim will be rare no matter what the pleading standard 
is, because cases close to the margin of dismissal simply will not be 
filed. For the same reason, motions to dismiss will be uncommon. 
In this respect, the data are uncontroversial: Dismissals for 
failure to state a claim were rare in the past and are rare to-
day—maybe 2 percent of federal civil cases end with a dismissal 
for failure to state a claim.89 Indeed, motions to dismiss are filed 
in only about 5 percent of cases, a rate that has remained rough-
ly constant since before Twombly.90 
Perhaps most striking is that even in the pre-FRCP world of 
common-law pleading, the demurrer—precursor to the motion to 
dismiss—was rare. Dean Clark, the architect of notice pleading, 
testified to this fact in describing the state of pleading in 1938 as 
follows: 
I have had some experience in studying the statistics of 
trial courts, and very rarely indeed does a final action come 
on a demurrer—very, very rarely. The percentage is almost 
 
 89 See Joe S. Cecil, et al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: 
Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules *9, 14 (Federal Ju-
dicial Center, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/PS98-NW6D. An examination of 
these tables reveals that across all cases in two samples from 2006 and 2010, about 5 
percent of cases involved motions to dismiss and about 40 percent of rulings on motions 
to dismiss were granted without leave to amend. Thus, 2 percent (0.05 × 0.40) of cases 
involved motions to dismiss being granted without leave to amend. Of course, this is just 
a rough estimate; for example, courts do not ultimately rule on every motion to dismiss 
that is filed. 
 90 Id at *9 (indicating motion to dismiss filing rates of 4 percent in 2006 and 6 per-
cent in 2010). Earlier work, based on smaller samples, suggests that numbers may have 
been somewhat higher at earlier points in time. Thomas E. Willging, Use of Rule 12(b)(6) 
in Two Federal District Courts *6–8 (Federal Judicial Center, July 1989), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6ZFX-EMH9 (finding, in samples of cases from 1975, 1978, and 1988, mo-
tions to dismiss filed in 10 to 15 percent of cases and case dispositions based on motions 
to dismiss in 1 to 6 percent of cases). 
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infinitesimal. Actually demurrers cut a very small figure in 
any general picture of the court’s business.91 
Thus, the experience under common-law pleading, even in the 
eyes of Clark himself, counseled that there was no reason to ex-
pect changes in pleading standards to dramatically affect practice. 
Of course, while this fact is consistent with my theory of 
pleading, it hardly proves it. There may be other reasons why dis-
missal rates might remain constant, even across long periods and 
various pleading regimes. Most obviously, selection effects may 
confound any effort to draw inferences from trends in dismissal 
rates. If a change in the law induces changes in filing and settle-
ment behavior, these changes may affect the composition of cases 
subject to motions to dismiss, thereby rendering changes in motion 
to dismiss filing rates and dismissal rates hard to detect. Still, lack 
of change in dismissal rates is informative.92 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to systematically address 
such empirical issues. Rather, for the remainder of this Part, I con-
centrate largely on qualitative evidence. In this respect, the quali-
tative evidence discussed below has the advantage of being less 
sensitive to the selection effects that have bedeviled the empiri-
cal literature on Twombly and Iqbal. For example, open-ended 
survey questions to practitioners allow respondents to describe 
any effects of pleading standards on potential cases that were 
considered but never filed because the pleading standard affect-
ed their viability. 
In the following sections, I identify several predictions of my 
theory and present qualitative evidence indicating that these 
predictions are consistent with experience. 
B. Practitioner Surveys 
My theory of pleading generates several predictions about 
how practitioners themselves would perceive the effects of a 
change in pleading standards from notice pleading to plausibility 
pleading. The theory predicts that: (1) Practitioners will be 
largely unaffected by changes in pleading standards. 
(2) Plaintiffs’ attorneys will plead in detail regardless of the 
 
 91 Dawson, Rules of Civil Procedure at 239 (cited in note 11) (quoting Clark’s state-
ment about FRCP 12 to the Institute on Federal Rules of the American Bar Association). 
 92 See Daniel Klerman and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J 
Legal Stud 209, 210–14 (2014) (showing that the leading models of selection in litigation 
and settlement will, under plausible conditions, allow inferences to be drawn from 
changes in plaintiffs’ trial win rates (or the lack thereof)). 
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pleading standard. (3) Plaintiffs’ attorneys will screen cases for 
plausible merit regardless of the pleading standard. 
Surveys of practitioners lend support to these predictions. In 
December 2009 and January 2010, Willging and Lee surveyed 
both plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense attorneys across a range of 
practice areas about the effects of Twombly and Iqbal, reporting 
that “[m]ost interviewees indicated that they had not seen any 
impact of the two cases in their practice.”93 
A survey by Rebecca Hamburg and Matthew Koski lends 
support to every one of these predictions.94 This study was com-
missioned by the National Employment Lawyers Association 
(NELA), an organization of attorneys who represent plaintiffs in 
employment litigation.95 I emphasize this study because it surveys 
attorneys for the group often considered the most affected by 
plausibility pleading: employment discrimination plaintiffs. 
Hamburg and Koski surveyed members of NELA during October 
and November 2009—two and a half years after Twombly and 
about six months after Iqbal. The respondents were overwhelm-
ingly critical of Twombly and Iqbal,96 and some reported hearing 
about others being hurt by the new pleading standards.97 But 
based on the respondents’ descriptions of their own experiences, 
it appears that the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on complaint 
drafting was modest and the effect on pleading outcomes was nil. 
Most of the plaintiffs’ attorneys surveyed by Hamburg and 
Koski reported that Twombly and Iqbal “affected the way in 
which they structure complaints” and that they “include more 
factual allegations in their complaints.”98 Thus, this survey sug-
gests an effect of plausibility pleading on the drafting of com-
plaints. But the survey also confirmed that factually detailed 
pleading has always been the norm. By far the most frequent 
 
 93 Willging and Lee, In Their Words at *1, 25 (cited in note 44). 
 94 See generally Rebecca M. Hamburg and Matthew C. Koski, Summary of Results 
of Federal Judicial Center Survey of NELA Members, Fall 2009 (NELA, Mar 26, 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/E7XP-93RB. 
 95 “NELA advances employee rights and serves lawyers who advocate for equality 
and justice in the workplace. NELA provides assistance and support to lawyers in pro-
tecting the rights of employees against the greater resources of their employers and the 
defense bar.” Id at *3. 
 96 By my count, of the respondents who offered their own comments about pleading, 
85 of 150 made comments criticizing Twombly or Iqbal. Id at *62–75. 
 97 See id at *62, 65–66. 
 98 Hamburg and Koski, Summary of Results at *10, 28 (cited in note 94). Seventy 
percent agreed with the former statement and over 94 percent agreed with the latter 
statement. Id at *28.  
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description of the attorneys’ own experiences was some version 
of the following: 
“I have always drafted detailed complaints.”99 
Willging and Lee report virtually identical feedback from the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys they surveyed: 
“We have always included more than is necessary for notice 
pleadings.” 
“I never did notice pleading, always much more.” 
“I have always done very fact-intensive pleading and could 
always add more facts if needed.”100 
Further, the attorneys who were surveyed by Hamburg and 
Koski and those surveyed by Willging and Lee confirmed that 
screening cases for merit by plaintiffs’ attorneys was a regular 
practice long before Twombly: 
“I plead facts based on the prescreening I do before filing a 
case. My work is done up front and I plead with specificity.”101 
“Plaintiff’s counsel who practice wholly in this area also gen-
erally take nearly all work on a contingent fee basis, as almost 
no clients can afford to pay attorney’s fees, and therefore are 
already extraordinarily careful in case selection.”102 
“I have always carefully screened my cases.”103 
These statements echo earlier survey findings on the screening 
role of plaintiffs’ attorneys. A decade before Twombly, Professor 
Herbert Kritzer concluded that “contingency fee lawyers general-
ly turn down at least as many cases as they accept, and often 
turn down considerably more than they accept.”104 
 
 99 Id at *64. By my count, thirty-one respondents volunteered something to this ef-
fect. Of these, twenty-seven explicitly said that they had “always” pleaded with detail. Id 
at *62–75. In contrast, seven said that they plead more facts, and three noted that de-
fendants are filing more motions to dismiss. Id. 
 100 Willging and Lee, In Their Words at *28–29 (cited in note 44). 
 101 Id at *29. 
 102 Hamburg and Koski, Summary of Results at *62 (cited in note 94).  
 103 Id at *64. 
 104 Kritzer, 81 Judicature at 26 (cited in note 21). See also id at 28:  
We might return to Elihu Root’s injunction, “about half of the practice of the 
decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools 
and should stop,” as one possible measure [of whether attorneys are too liti-
gious]. If we take “half of the practice,” to refer to the proportion of potential 
cases accepted, then most contingency fee lawyers achieve this measure of decency. 
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Most tellingly, the respondents reported essentially nothing 
in terms of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on filings or dismis-
sals. With regard to filings, of the 150 plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
offered comments on pleading, 1 attorney mentioned that 1 case 
was not filed because of Twombly or Iqbal. 
With regard to dismissals, recall that my theory also pre-
dicts that plaintiffs’ attorneys will report that they will rarely 
face, let alone lose, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
regardless of the pleading standard. In Hamburg and Koski’s 
survey of plaintiffs’ attorneys practicing employment litigation, 
92.8 percent of the surveyed plaintiffs’ attorneys had never—not 
once!—had a complaint dismissed under Twombly or Iqbal.105 
Some respondents had not even seen a single motion to dismiss 
filed since Twombly.106 Respondents in Willging and Lee’s survey 
had similarly little to report. Indeed, one respondent, speaking 
in the wake of Iqbal, explained: “I have never faced a serious 
challenge to a complaint in 20 years of practice and only have 
had 2–3 motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed.”107 
In short, it appears that Twombly and Iqbal have induced 
plaintiffs to add some padding to the factual detail in their com-
plaints, but long before Twombly, plaintiffs’ attorneys were 
screening cases on the merits and pleading with factual detail. 
As a consequence, the bottom line for plaintiffs, both before and 
after Twombly, is that motions to dismiss, let alone dismissals 
with prejudice, have been rare. 
C. Cross Jurisdictional Practice 
Just as my theory of pleading predicts that changes in 
pleading standards within a court system should have little ef-
fect on filing rates or pleading detail, it predicts that differences 
in pleading rules across jurisdictions should lead to few differ-
ences in practice. Even if selection effects bias quantitative evi-
dence on dismissal rates toward a finding of no difference, quali-
tative evidence on relative, overall advantages of pleading rules 
should account for the various ways in which pleading rules can 
affect practice. Thus, a qualitative, comparative approach to 
pleading practice could reveal the differing effects of different 
pleading standards. For example, one could survey the experiences 
 
 105 Hamburg and Koski, Summary of Results at *28 (cited in note 94).  
 106 See id at *68. 
 107 Willging and Lee, In Their Words at *25 (cited in note 44). 
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of practitioners in state courts and the courts of the District of 
Columbia. While the civil procedure rules of most states (and the 
District of Columbia) essentially mirror the FRCP, seventeen 
states have pleading rules that require some version of fact 
pleading—a pleading standard that is higher than plausibility 
pleading.108 These seventeen states compose more than half of 
the US population. 
Yet I know of no claims—whether from scholars or practi-
tioners, whether in print or conversation, whether systematic 
or anecdotal—that fact pleading standards have generated sys-
tematic differences in litigation practice in these states, either 
before or after Twombly. If anything, some anecdotes suggest the 
opposite. For example, when prodefendant organizations com-
plain about “judicial hellholes” that are (allegedly) inordinately 
generous to plaintiffs, such “hellholes” reside primarily in fact 
pleading, rather than notice pleading, states.109 Looking more 
broadly, Professor Scott Dodson notes that pleading in the United 
States is unique among countries: “America has the most lax 
pleading system in the world.”110 Often, when a complaint is 
filed, civil law jurisdictions require not only fact pleading but al-
so evidence.111 Yet Dodson observes little concern internationally 
over these differences in pleading rules.112 
And to add the most dubious sort of empirical evidence—
the personal anecdote: I practiced in Illinois (a fact pleading 
 
 108 See John B. Oakley and Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A 
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash L Rev 1367, 1371 (1986); 
John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 Nev L J 354, 358 
(2003). In sorting states into these categories, I rely on Professors John B. Oakley and 
Arthur F. Coon’s 1986 article. According to this study, the fact pleading states are 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia. Oakley and Coon, 61 Wash L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 108). In this con-
text, “fact pleading” includes code pleading and civil pleading (that is, pleading under the 
civil law system, which is used in Louisiana).  
 109 A recent report from the American Tort Reform Foundation on “judicial hellholes” 
lists fourteen state court jurisdictions as “judicial hellholes” or on a “watch list.” Judicial 
Hellholes *3–4 (American Tort Reform Foundation, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X46E-W7NR. Ten of these fourteen “hellhole” jurisdictions are located in 
fact pleading states: California, Florida, Illinois (three), Louisiana, New Jersey (two), New 
York, and Pennsylvania. The notice pleading jurisdictions on these lists are in Alabama, 
Mississippi, Nevada, and West Virginia. For the basis of my categorization of states into 
fact pleading and notice pleading categories, see Oakley and Coon, 61 Wash L Rev at 1378 
(cited in note 108); Oakley, 3 Nev L J at 356–58 (cited in note 108).  
 110 Dodson, 158 U Pa L Rev at 447 (cited in note 12).  
 111 Id at 453–55. 
 112 Id. 
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jurisdiction) for five years before Twombly. I litigated cases in 
both state court (fact pleading) and federal court (notice plead-
ing). In terms of length, specificity, and factual detail, the 
state court and federal court complaints I encountered were 
interchangeable.113 
D. Pro Se and IFP Plaintiffs 
Given that this theory of pleading rests on the screening role 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiffs themselves, one would ex-
pect that when neither the plaintiff nor her attorney bears the 
costs of litigation, the impetus to screen for merit will be weaker. 
If so, then pleading standards might have an effect, possibly 
even a large effect, on outcomes for such plaintiffs. 
Empirically, we might expect that pro se plaintiffs, who are 
not constrained by an attorney and may have a very low oppor-
tunity cost of their time, and IFP plaintiffs, whose costs are sub-
sidized by the state and who may have appointed or pro bono 
counsel, will be affected by pleading standards. This prediction 
may manifest itself empirically in changes in dismissal rates of 
pro se or IFP cases after a change from notice pleading to plau-
sibility pleading. 
This prediction with respect to dismissal rates has an im-
portant advantage over hypotheses about dismissal rates gener-
ally. The premise underlying this prediction is that pro se and 
IFP plaintiffs do not face economic incentives to change their 
settlement or filing patterns in response to pleading standards.114 
 
 113 The two quantitative studies that have looked for differential patterns across fact 
pleading and notice pleading states in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal have also found 
none. See Jill Curry and Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs 
File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 Tex Tech L Rev 827, 865–72 (2013); 
Roger Michalski and Abby K. Wood, Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level *27–45 (un-
published manuscript, July 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/E9KF-KBCN. Jill Curry 
and Matthew Ward search for changes in patterns of removal from state to federal court, 
based on the theory that defendants in notice pleading states will now have a greater 
preference for pleading standards in federal court. But they find no evidence that patterns 
of removal to federal court responded to Twombly and Iqbal, and no difference in response 
between notice pleading and fact pleading states. Curry and Ward, 45 Tex Tech L Rev at 
828–30 (cited in note 113). Professors Roger Michalski and Abby K. Wood compare case 
filings and outcomes in state courts in Nebraska, a state that adopted plausibility plead-
ing in the wake of Twombly, with outcomes in a set of states that did not adopt plausibility 
pleading. They find no evidence that adoption of plausibility pleading changed litigation 
outcomes in Nebraska. Michalski and Wood, Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level at *3–
8 (cited in note 113).  
 114 To be more precise, the claim is that for this group of (potential) plaintiffs, many 
of them are close to the margin with respect to meeting the pleading standard but are 
 740  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:693 
   
In other words, for this group of plaintiffs, selection effects 
should be at their nadir. 
Ironically, much of the empirical work on the effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal (including some of mine) has excluded pro se 
and IFP plaintiffs from their analyses.115 This is because the Su-
preme Court appeared to carve out such cases from the applica-
tion of Twombly in Erickson, which reversed the grant of a motion 
to dismiss a complaint by a pro se prisoner and insisted that a pro 
se pleading is “to be liberally construed.”116 Nonetheless, Dodson 
as well as Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg in-
clude such plaintiffs in their empirical studies of court judgments 
before and after Twombly and Iqbal.117 These studies offer sug-
gestive evidence that pro se and IFP plaintiffs are, in fact, more 
affected by pleading standards than represented plaintiffs.118 
E. Settlement Patterns 
The claim that detailed pleading serves to facilitate settle-
ment suggests a straightforward prediction about settlement: 
because detailed pleading serves as a credible signal of the 
strength of a plaintiff’s case, the filing of a complaint may be suf-
ficient to induce settlement, even without any other litigation ac-
tivity. In a recent study, Professors Christina Boyd and David 
Hoffman examine litigation activity in a sample of federal civil 
cases and find that about one-third of filed lawsuits are set-
tled without any litigation activity occurring—no motions, no 
discovery.119 This poses the question: If the parties had no 
 
inframarginal (that is, unaffected by the pleading standard) with respect to the decisions 
to file or to settle. Anecdotally, at least, this seems a tenable characterization of a mean-
ingful share of pro se and IFP cases. 
 115 See, for example, Hubbard, 42 J Legal Stud at 61–62 (cited in note 20). 
 116 Erickson, 551 US at 94, quoting Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106 (1976). 
 117 Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 Judica-
ture 127, 130–32, 134 (Nov–Dec 2012); Clermont and Eisenberg, 100 Cornell L Rev at 
206–07 (cited in note 20).  
 118 Dodson includes represented plaintiffs, plaintiffs proceeding pro se, and IFP plain-
tiffs. Dodson, 96 Judicature at 130–32 (cited in note 117). Analysis of his results reveals 
that the statistically significant effect is entirely concentrated among prisoner-litigation 
claims brought by IFP prisoners; there is no significant change in the rate at which district 
courts dismiss claims in cases with represented plaintiffs. (This conclusion is based on 
analysis of Table 2 of Dodson’s article.) Id at 132. Clermont and Eisenberg use administra-
tive data and report effects of Twombly and Iqbal that are concentrated among pro se cases. 
Clermont and Eisenberg, 100 Cornell L Rev at 194–95, 206–07 (cited in note 20). 
 119 Christina L. Boyd and David A. Hoffman, Litigating toward Settlement, 29 J L, 
Econ & Org 898, 911 (2012). It should be noted, though, that Boyd and Hoffman’s sample 
was limited to cases involving corporate veil piercing allegations. Id at 908–09. While I 
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need for motion practice or discovery to reach settlement, why 
did the plaintiff bother to file at all? The answer provided 
above is that the act of filing a detailed complaint itself pro-
motes settlement.120 
F. Case Law 
While the thought experiment presented in Part I presup-
poses an absence of case law or doctrine on pleading, Part II rec-
ognizes that there are pleading standards enforced by judges and 
that this theory of pleading should predict both the nature of the 
complaints that judges see and how judges respond. While it 
would be impossible for this Article to satisfactorily canvas the 
jurisprudence on pleading, I offer a handful of examples, includ-
ing the two seminal pleading cases, Conley and Twombly, to 
suggest that the pleadings in those cases, and the judicial re-
sponses to those pleadings, are better predicted by this theory of 
pleading than by even the doctrine attributed to those very cases. 
I begin with Conley, the case that has long stood for notice 
pleading.121 The funny thing about Conley is that the pleadings 
in Conley were rife with factual detail. The Court summarized 
the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint: 
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans 
Railroad at its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the 
Brotherhood was the designated bargaining agent under the 
Railway Labor Act for the bargaining unit to which petition-
ers belonged. 
A contract existed between the Union and the Railroad 
which gave the employees in the bargaining unit certain 
protection from discharge and loss of seniority. 
 
see no reason why these cases would be exceptional in any way relevant to the argument 
here, there remains a need for further empirical evidence on this point. 
 120 This is hardly a secret among practitioners. See, for example, Robert L. Haig, ed, 
1 Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § 7:33 at 572 (Thomson Reuters 
3d ed 2011): 
A well-developed complaint may force the defendant to confront many ques-
tions that will require answers if it hopes to prevail; the more of these ques-
tions that give the defense pause, the more likely that it will be receptive to 
considering early settlement discussions or mediation on terms favorable to the 
plaintiff. 
 121 Conley, 355 US at 47 (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of 
the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”) (citation omitted). 
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In May 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs held 
by petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either dis-
charged or demoted. 
In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all but instead 
filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a few 
instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs 
but with loss of seniority. 
Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union, acting ac-
cording to plan, did nothing to protect them against these 
discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protec-
tion comparable to that given white employees.122 
Could there have been any doubt that this complaint contained 
enough factual detail to state a plausible claim under Twombly? 
No. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Conley said it had “no doubt” 
that the complaint’s factual allegations were sufficient.123 Rather, 
the central question in Conley had nothing to do with pleading of 
facts; it was whether the duty of “fair representation” under the 
Railway Labor Act barred racial discrimination by the union in 
pursuing grievances brought by union members.124 As Professor 
Alexander Reinert notes, “Conley was a strange poster child for 
notice pleading—the plaintiffs had provided extensive factual de-
tail, they had specified their legal claims, and neither party 
briefed or addressed Rule 8.”125 For the complaint in Conley itself, 
nothing turned on the difference between notice pleading and 
plausibility pleading. 
In the long interim between Conley and Twombly, a small lit-
erature documented the consistent practice of the federal courts to 
see, and expect, factually detailed pleadings, even in the wake of 
Conley. Thirty years ago, Professor Richard Marcus concluded 
that notice pleading was a “chimera.”126 Over a decade ago, Pro-
fessor Christopher Fairman called it a “myth,”127 providing nu-
merous examples of what appeared to be a wide range of ad hoc 
standards employed by district courts in ruling on motions to 
dismiss.128 These standards, whatever they were, were not notice 
 
 122 Id at 43 (paragraph breaks added). 
 123 Id at 48. 
 124 Id at 43, 45–46.  
 125 Reinert, 86 Ind L J at 128 (cited in note 4). 
 126 Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 451 (cited in note 12).  
 127 Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Ariz L Rev 987, 
988 (2003). 
 128 Id at 998–1011. 
 2016] A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading 743 
 
pleading. Judges expected something more and were willing to 
dismiss the occasional complaint that failed to state a plausible 
case. Marcus lamented: “Whatever the reason, for more than 
twenty years after Conley, there was virtually no academic 
recognition that pleading practice had not vanished; defendants 
continued to make motions to dismiss and courts continued to 
grant them.”129 Of course, Conley’s famous dictum did not go 
away. As recently as 2002, in Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA,130 the 
Court recited the rule that “[a] court may dismiss a complaint 
only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of 
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”131 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court itself in Twombly noted 
that over the previous half century, “a good many judges and 
commentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Con-
ley passage as a pleading standard.”132 A striking example of 
such a “balk” is Car Carriers, Inc v Ford Motor Co,133 which, like 
Twombly, involved a complaint alleging an antitrust conspiracy 
that the court held failed to state a claim, despite a number of 
detailed factual allegations.134 Twenty-three years before 
Twombly, the Car Carriers court said no fewer than three 
times that given the allegations in the complaint, the claim 
was “implausible.”135 
Finally, the Twombly litigation reveals the same pattern of 
detailed pleading and an implicit requirement of factual allega-
tions that render a claim plausible. The most telling if oft-
overlooked fact about Twombly is this: in 2003, the district court 
dismissed the complaint.136 Notably, the district court did so only 
a year after Swierkiewicz reiterated the Conley dictum. The Su-
preme Court’s “sweeping,” “startling,” and “surprising”137 deci-
sion in Twombly simply affirmed the decision that the district 
 
 129 Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 434 (cited in note 12).  
 130 534 US 506 (2002). 
 131 Id at 514, quoting Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 US 69, 73 (1984) (brackets in 
original). Note, though, that Leatherman v Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 
Coordination Unit, 507 US 163 (1993), another oft-cited pre-Twombly pleading case, 
avoided citing this dictum. 
 132 Twombly, 550 US at 562. 
 133 745 F2d 1101 (7th Cir 1984). 
 134 Id at 1104–05, 1110. 
 135 Id at 1109–10.  
 136 Twombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 313 F Supp 2d 174, 189 (SDNY 2003), vacd and 
remd, 425 F3d 99 (2d Cir 2005), revd, 550 US 544 (2007). 
 137 Smith, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 1063 (cited in note 3). 
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court, subject to the binding precedent of Conley and 
Swierkiewicz, made four years prior. 
Notable, too, is the Second Circuit’s opinion, which was re-
versed by the Supreme Court. It invoked the terminology of 
plausibility pleading, even as it vacated the district court opin-
ion. Consider the following quotations, which are drawn from the 
Second Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly. 
Pop quiz: Which of these quotations come from the court embrac-
ing notice pleading, and which come from the court rejecting it? 
A: “If a pleaded conspiracy is implausible on the basis of the 
facts as pleaded—if the allegations amount to no more than 
‘unlikely speculations’—the complaint will be dismissed.”138 
B: “[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, 
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausi-
ble on its face.”139 
C: “We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that 
on one side of that balance is the sometimes colossal expense 
of undergoing discovery, that such costs themselves likely 
lead defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle what would ulti-
mately be shown to be meritless claims, [and] that the suc-
cess of such meritless claims encourages others to be 
brought.”140 
D: “[Pleading rules serve the practical purpose of prevent-
ing] a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim [to] be al-
lowed to take up the time of a number of other people, with 
the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of 
the settlement value. . . . Thus, it is one thing to be cautious 
before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of dis-
covery . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to an-
titrust discovery can be expensive.”141 
Whatever the difference was between the Second Circuit, 
which applied the notice pleading standard of Conley, and the 
Supreme Court, which announced a new regime of plausibility 
pleading, it was not that the Second Circuit failed to require that 
the plaintiff’s claim for relief be plausible! 
 
 138 Twombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 425 F3d 99, 111 (2d Cir 2005), revd, 550 US 
544 (2007). 
 139 Twombly, 550 US at 570.  
 140 Twombly, 425 F3d at 117.  
 141 Twombly, 550 US at 558 (quotation marks omitted). 
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In sum, the complaint in Conley would have survived under 
Twombly, the district court in Twombly dismissed the complaint 
under Conley, and the Second Circuit in Twombly required plau-
sibility under Conley. These facts together raise at least the pos-
sibility that, just as detailed pleading has been nothing new for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, plausibility pleading has been nothing new 
for judges. As one practitioner argued shortly after it was decid-
ed, Twombly “is less a sea change as it is a recognition of what 
was already going [on] out there in the trenches.”142 
This leaves only the puzzle of why the Supreme Court both-
ered to address pleading standards when it did—or at all. On 
this question, I offer only conjectures. Perhaps Twombly and Iq-
bal were simply “oddball” cases, to use the term coined by Pro-
fessor Suja Thomas,143 and perhaps the Supreme Court was en-
gaged in rare exercises in error correction. Perhaps they are just 
a product of the Roberts Court’s distinctive interest in civil pro-
cedure and the Court’s efforts, as Professor Howard Wasserman 
puts it, to “clean up doctrinal confusion” in the field.144 Perhaps 
the Supreme Court is a lagging, rather than leading, indicator of 
changes in civil procedure and practice; Professor Hillel Levin 
has noted that this is not the first time that a landmark Su-
preme Court decision on procedure ultimately proved to be little 
more than a confirmation of existing practice.145 Indeed, for more 
than a decade after the Celotex trilogy was decided in 1986,146 a 
steady stream of articles argued that these cases had brought 
about the end of the jury trial. But empirical studies found that 
summary judgment rates rose, and trial rates fell, years before 
the Celotex trilogy, and that in fact those rates were basically 
flat throughout the 1980s.147 
 
 142 Jeff Jeffrey, The Changing World of Civil Procedure Post Twombly, Iqbal (The 
Blog of Legal Times, June 18, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/4Q9W-23MS (quoting 
attorney Andrew Pincus).  
 143 Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 
2011 U Ill L Rev 215, 216.  
 144 Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 
Rev Litig 313, 317 (2012).  
 145 Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 Lewis 
& Clark L Rev 143, 143–45 (2010).  
 146 See generally Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 
(1986); Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242 (1986); Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 
317 (1986).  
 147 See Joe S. Cecil, et al, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practices in Six 
Federal District Courts, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 861, 872, 881–83 (2007).   
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IV.  THE “LIBERAL ETHOS” IN MODERN PRACTICE 
In presenting its account of plausibility pleading, the objec-
tives of this Article have been essentially descriptive, rather 
than normative. But if plausibility pleading is—and has long 
been—the norm, one might ask whether this stands in tension 
with the purposes of pleading under the FRCP and the liberal 
ethos that the FRCP introduced in 1938. As Professor Marcus 
put it, “Dean Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules 
set out to devise a procedural system that would install what 
may be labelled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the preferred dispo-
sition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through 
discovery.”148 
Professor Spencer captures a widespread sentiment in argu-
ing that with Twombly and Iqbal the courts have rejected the 
liberal ethos of civil procedure in favor of what he calls the “re-
strictive ethos” in civil procedure.149 The restrictive ethos is 
“characterized by a desire to discourage certain claims and to 
keep systemic litigation costs under control.”150 This “restrictive 
ethos . . . frustrates the ability of claimants to prosecute their 
claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court.”151 
While the merely descriptive account presented in this Arti-
cle does not establish any definitive normative claims about 
plausibility pleading, it does provide a framework for under-
standing its effects, which facilitates an evaluation of the doc-
trine. As I argue herein, the juxtaposition of “liberal” notice 
pleading and “restrictive” plausibility pleading may be more ap-
parent than real. As Professor Bone has argued, the vision of the 
drafters of the FRCP was a pragmatic one,152 and we should en-
tertain the possibility that plausibility pleading serves the same 
ends today that notice pleading sought to serve in 1938. Indeed, 
I make a more audacious claim: The paradox of plausibility 
pleading is not that it hurts plaintiffs facing information asym-
metries. Rather, it is that plausibility pleading not only is con-
sistent with the liberal ethos but also may help both defendants 
and plaintiffs in a world of costly litigation and sometimes-
hostile judges. 
 
 148 Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 439 (cited in note 12).  
 149 Spencer, 78 Geo Wash L Rev at 353 (cited in note 14).  
 150 Id at 366. 
 151 Id at 353–54 (quotation marks omitted). 
 152 Bone, 94 Iowa L Rev at 890–98 (cited in note 22).  
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Of course, Twombly and Iqbal certainly do not promote the 
resolution of disputes by jury trial or after discovery. Quite the 
opposite: they seem to prefer disposition at the pleading stage, be-
fore discovery. But any conclusion as to the demise of the liberal 
ethos and the rise of the restrictive ethos would be doubly over-
stated. Judged by the standard of “disposition [ ] on the merits, 
by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery,”153 the liberal 
ethos has never taken hold; jury trials after full discovery consti-
tute about 3 percent of all federal court civil dispositions and did 
so long before Twombly.154 But neither has the restrictive ethos 
taken hold; both before and after Twombly and Iqbal, granted 
motions to dismiss compose an equally small share of federal 
court civil dispositions. This bears repeating: only about 3 per-
cent of federal civil cases are resolved by a jury trial—but only 
about 3 percent of federal civil cases are resolved by a motion to 
dismiss. 
More to the point, judges have never been the gatekeepers to 
federal court, either before or after Twombly and Iqbal. That role 
has always belonged to plaintiffs’ attorneys. Pleading standards 
have little bite because litigation costs and litigation strategy 
constrain plaintiffs far more severely than pleading rules. 
The infrequency of jury trials and the relative unimportance 
of pleading standards are signs that our usual conception of the 
liberal ethos relies on a dichotomy—between resolution on the 
merits at trial and resolution due to technical defects in the 
pleadings—that no longer exists. This dichotomy famously exist-
ed under common-law pleading and was a concern of Clark and 
the drafters of the FRCP.155 But it is irrelevant today. Instead, 
both resolution at trial and resolution on the pleadings are unu-
sual outcomes in modern litigation. As Professor Maria Glover 
notes, the real endgame is settlement.156 The liberal ethos of the 
FRCP needs to be understood in this light. 
How does one translate the liberal ethos into a world of set-
tlement? The key can be found in another famous dictum from 
 
 153 Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 439 (cited in note 12) (emphasis added). 
 154 Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adju-
dications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J 
Empirical Legal Stud 705, 715 (2004).  
 155 See Spencer, 78 Geo Wash L Rev at 354–56 (cited in note 14) (“Simplified plead-
ing and broad discovery were designed to promote resolution of disputes on the substan-
tive merits as opposed to procedural technicalities.”) (citations omitted).  
 156 J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 NYU L Rev 1713, 
1715–16 (2012).  
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Conley: “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a 
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to 
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of plead-
ing is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”157 The critical 
distinction is not between pleading and trial, but between reso-
lution of litigation as a game of skill versus resolution on the 
merits. With common-law pleading long buried, however, the 
game of skill today is not exploitation of the traps and technicali-
ties of pleading but rather strategies that lead to settlements or 
other outcomes unjustified by the merits of the claim but instead 
driven by litigation costs. These strategies can be used to deprive 
both plaintiffs and defendants of resolution on the merits. Of 
course, the Twombly Court was focused on the dangers that high 
litigation costs pose to defendants,158 but this concern is not 
unique to them. From the plaintiff’s perspective, litigation costs 
are also a first-order concern, because high litigation costs deter 
potentially meritorious claims for modest damages. 
Once viewed in this light, it is no foregone conclusion that 
plausibility pleading represents a departure from the liberal 
ethos. First, plausibility pleading must be judged on the extent 
to which it promotes or inhibits resolution on the merits rather 
than through a game of skill. In Part IV.A, I argue that plausi-
bility pleading serves the ends of the liberal ethos. Although it 
hardly promotes discovery or jury trials, it does foster the resolu-
tion of cases on the merits that otherwise would be not tried to a 
jury but rather settled based on a game of skill. 
Second, plausibility pleading’s effect on plaintiffs, and on the 
ability of aggrieved parties to gain access to discovery, must be 
assessed in light of the fact that the vast majority of complaints 
will never be challenged with a motion to dismiss, and thus we 
must ask what effect plausibility pleading has on those plaintiffs 
close to the margin of dismissal. In Part IV.B, I argue that rais-
ing pleading standards can increase access to the courts for 
those marginal plaintiffs whose risky but plausible claims would 
otherwise be too expensive to litigate. 
A. “On the Merits” Rather Than a “Game of Skill” 
Despite the fact that it is a source of much criticism of the 
plausibility standard, the whole point of the plausibility 
 
 157 Conley, 355 US at 48. 
 158 Twombly, 550 US at 558–59.  
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standard is that the court is judging the merits of the com-
plaint.159 It is true, of course, that a judicial judgment on the 
merits early in a case is likely to be less accurate than a judicial 
(or jury) judgment on the merits after full discovery and trial.160 
This is a fair criticism. But the relevance of this fact is overstat-
ed. It assumes that the alternative to a decision at the pleading 
stage is a decision at the trial stage. However, such an assump-
tion is almost quaint in a world in which fewer than 5 percent of 
cases reach trial.161 Instead, most cases settle. Thus, the relevant 
comparison is the extent to which a decision (one way or the oth-
er) at the pleading stage is a less accurate reflection of the mer-
its than a settlement by the parties in the shadow of the likely 
outcome, and the likely cost, of taking a case to judgment. In-
deed, Twombly’s concern was a case that would settle not be-
cause it had merit, but because the costs of discovery were large 
and asymmetrically burdensome to the defendant. In short, the 
alternative to dismissal is not necessarily resolution on the 
merits. Settlement may or may not be on the merits, and dis-
missing a case on the merits is preferable to settlement not on 
the merits. 
Of course, because the true merit of a case is never perfectly 
observable to the court, any system that dismisses some cases at 
the pleading stage runs the risk of dismissing a case that, had it 
not been dismissed, would have settled on the merits. It is this 
trade-off between benefit (preventing settlements not on the 
merits) and cost (preventing settlements on the merits) that is, 
or at least should be, the central issue in the debate on the wis-
dom of Twombly and Iqbal. We must assess the extent to which 
plausibility pleading makes a difference in those cases that 
might otherwise be decided on the merits rather than as a game 
of skill. 
 
 159 Marcus made this point long before Twombly. Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 454 
(cited in note 12):  
Under the received tradition, the problem with common law pleading practice 
was that, while it led to actual decisions, it often did not lead to merits deci-
sions because cases were frequently resolved on technicalities. The notice 
pleading scenario, by way of contrast, eliminates the possibility for even genu-
ine merits decisions at the pleadings stage. The middle ground is to use plead-
ings practice to make genuine and reliable merits decisions. Contrary to expec-
tation, this activity is not dead, though it is often camouflaged in notice 
pleading language.  
 160 See, for example, Steinman, 62 Stan L Rev at 1312 (cited in note 4); Spencer, 49 
BC L Rev at 434 (cited in note 4); Hoffman, 88 BU L Rev at 1263 (cited in note 6). 
 161 See Hadfield, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud at 715 (cited in note 154). 
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In this respect, the theory of pleading that I develop above 
offers guidance: in most cases, the pleading standard simply will 
not make a difference. Importantly, this is true even for cases in 
which there is an asymmetry of information favoring the defend-
ant. There are some categories of cases, though, for which plead-
ing standards may affect whether a case is filed or, if it is filed, 
whether it is dismissed: (1) cases with pro se or IFP plaintiffs; 
(2) suits driven by spite, indignation, or optimism; (3) low-merit 
nuisance suits; and (4) shoot-the-moon cases. 
Notably, three of these four categories comprise cases that, 
by definition, do not settle on the merits. Suits filed only because 
of spite, indignation, or optimism, as well as low-merit nuisance 
suits and shoot-the-moon cases, have settlement value despite 
their lack of merit. 
So, for the vast bulk of cases that are going to settle on the 
merits, the pleading standard is not going to have much (if any) 
effect on outcomes. And most types of cases for which plausibility 
pleading may lead to more dismissals are cases that will not oth-
erwise settle on the merits. By replacing settlement not on the 
merits with dismissal on the merits, plausibility pleading serves, 
rather than departs from, the ends of the liberal ethos. 
But not perfectly. The fourth category of cases that may be af-
fected by plausibility pleading includes cases with pro se or IFP 
plaintiffs. While many cases brought by such plaintiffs may be low 
merit such that dismissal is normatively desirable, many may not 
be. In particular, one might expect pro se plaintiffs to be less effec-
tive than represented parties at assessing the merits of their 
claims, screening on the merits, and drafting detailed and effective 
complaints. The classic case, Dioguardi v Durning,162 is emblemat-
ic of precisely this concern. If so, and if higher pleading standards 
are applied to such plaintiffs, then relatively strong cases may be 
dismissed under a higher pleading standard. This counsels caution 
in the application of plausibility pleading to pro se and IFP plain-
tiffs. For these claimants, Erickson provides a doctrinal hook for a 
more liberal approach,163 and perhaps it is no surprise that one of 
the leading examples of liberality in the application of plausibility 
pleading, Swanson v Citibank, NA,164 involved a pro se plaintiff.165 
 
 162 139 F2d 774 (2d Cir 1944) (Clark). 
 163 Erickson, 551 US at 94. 
 164 614 F3d 400 (7th Cir 2010). 
 165 Id at 402. 
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B. When to Hold and When to Fold166 
Imagine a poker player who sits down to play a hand of pok-
er. Both she and her opponent are skilled poker players, but only 
one will win the hand; the other will lose all of the money she 
has bet. But this poker player has to worry not only about her 
opponent, for this is an unusual poker game. There is a third 
person sitting at the table, the dealer, and although most dealers 
are fair, there is a chance that this dealer has stacked the deck 
against her. Of course, she still may be able to win the hand; a 
good player will sometimes beat the odds. But a good player also 
knows that, on average, she will lose more than she wins when 
the deck is stacked against her. 
The dealer deals the players their cards. Our player looks at 
her hand: it is a decent, but not great, set of cards. With a fair 
deck, she would have a good shot at winning the hand, but with 
a stacked deck, this hand is a losing proposition. She faces a di-
lemma: What to do? 
At this point, imagine that the dealer says the following: “I 
know you’re worried about whether you’re playing with a 
stacked deck. I’m not going to keep you in the dark forever. After 
you have placed your bets and just before you reveal your hand, I 
will reveal whether the deck is stacked against you.” 
Now, consider an alternative scenario. The dealer instead 
says, “I will reveal whether the deck is stacked at the very be-
ginning of the game, before you place any bets. But there is a 
catch: if I reveal that the deck is stacked against you, I will force 
you to fold.” 
In which scenario is our poker player better off? Put another 
way, in which scenario would our poker player even be willing to 
sit down at the table? 
In the first scenario, our poker player’s response to the deal-
er’s offer will be, “Thanks for nothing.” By the time she discovers 
whether the deck is stacked, she has already placed her bets and 
there is nothing she can do but hope for the best and see how the 
cards fall. 
But in the second scenario, it is as if she is playing a fair 
game. If the dealer reveals a fair deck, then she can play the 
game with confidence. And if the dealer reveals a stacked deck, 
 
 166 I am indebted to conversations with Professors Bill Landes and J.J. Prescott for 
developing the ideas in this Section. They bear no culpability, however, for the poker 
metaphor. But see Kenny Rogers, The Gambler (United Artists 1978).  
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then she has no choice but to fold—but that is exactly what she 
would do anyway, given that she now knows she is playing an 
unfair game. The early revelation of information ensures that 
she risks her money only when the deck is fair. 
* * * 
A major concern with plausibility pleading is that the vague, 
loosely defined standard of plausibility invites or even requires 
the exercise of discretion by judges, who may exercise their dis-
cretion in a way that reflects bias, whether conscious or uncon-
scious. To the extent that these biases reflect hostility or incre-
dulity toward the claims of certain plaintiffs, this could lead to 
those claims being dismissed—even if such claims, objectively 
considered, deserve an opportunity for discovery and trial on the 
merits.167 
This is a powerful critique of the plausibility standard. But 
this critique looks only at the dismissal decision itself, ignoring 
the larger context in which a motion to dismiss takes place. A 
judge exercises discretion throughout a lawsuit—discretion that 
can profoundly affect the likely outcome of a trial or the value of a 
settlement. In other words, the problem that this critique identi-
fies is not the plausibility standard—it is judicial bias. 
Of course, no plaintiff wants to see her complaint dismissed 
because the judge is biased against her claim. But whether the 
complaint is dismissed or not, the plaintiff is stuck with the 
judge to whom her case is assigned, and that same judge will de-
cide motions on the scope of discovery, motions for summary 
judgment, and evidentiary motions at trial. Thus, plausibility 
pleading does not create the problem of judicial bias; it simply 
reveals it earlier in the litigation process. And as the poker 
analogy above makes clear, if one faces a potentially biased deci-
sionmaker, it is better to have the decisionmaker reveal his bias 
sooner rather than later. A judicial order revealing whether the 
 
 167 See Bone, 94 Iowa L Rev at 889 (cited in note 22) (noting that “critics fear that 
Twombly gives too much latitude to district judges, who are eager to screen cases and 
likely to read the opinion as granting permission to do so”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal 
and the Slide toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 185, 199–200 (2010) 
(“Indeed, an important function of the jury is to screen out [the judge’s] institutional bias, 
making it even more disconcerting that the Iqbal decision gave judges more power to 
scrutinize facts at the pleading stage.”) (citation omitted); Hoffman, 88 BU L Rev at 1260 
(cited in note 6) (noting that “imbuing courts with discretion to conduct factual sufficien-
cy review of merits allegations is likely to lead to [ ] disparities in judicial practices at the 
pleading stage, across different categories of cases and different courts”).  
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judge considers a plaintiff’s claim plausible is a tremendously 
valuable piece of information to a plaintiff with an uncertain 
claim facing the prospect of spending tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars on a lawsuit that may be decided by a hostile 
judge. 
Strong cases will generally be immune from bias at the 
pleading stage, given that, for all the reasons elaborated above, 
plaintiffs with strong cases will be willing and able to draft fac-
tually detailed complaints. These complaints will easily meet the 
plausibility standard and will not even be challenged by motions 
to dismiss. A biased judge can do nothing about these cases. Bias 
matters, though, for cases close to the margin of plausibility. But 
precisely because they have weaker factual foundations, these 
cases are also likely to be marginal at summary judgment or at 
trial—times when the judges’ biases could also have profound ef-
fects. These marginal cases therefore stand to gain from plausi-
bility pleading, because a dismissal simply reveals what would 
likely be an inevitable outcome anyway—a loss on the merits at 
the hands of the judge—but without the investment in time and 
money necessary to get the case through discovery to summary 
judgment. 
To be clear, “bias” in this context need not reflect any im-
proper prejudice against a party, although it is precisely this sort 
of bias that motivates the concerns about plausibility pleading 
noted above. Rather, “bias” as I am using the term includes both 
improper prejudice and simply a judge’s personal take on the 
facts, distinct from the parties’ views. If the judge perceives or 
interprets the legal implications of facts alleged in the complaint 
differently from the plaintiff, this can have a major impact on 
the plaintiff’s likelihood of ultimate success on the merits! Thus, 
whether due to antiplaintiff attitudes or merely a good faith take 
on the facts, the judge’s bias is something that the plaintiff 
wants to identify sooner rather than later. 
Further, the denial of a motion to dismiss is a sign that the 
judge is not too biased against the plaintiff, and this is a valuable 
signal to the defendant as well. It means that the deck is not 
stacked in the defendant’s favor (and may even be stacked in the 
plaintiff’s favor). As a consequence, just as the granting of a mo-
tion to dismiss defeats a marginal claim but saves the plaintiff 
further litigation costs, the denial of a motion to dismiss reveals 
that the judge is more likely to be favorably disposed toward the 
plaintiff than previously estimated. This additional information 
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may, in turn, promote a quick settlement for the parties, given 
that the defendant’s outlook has dimmed and an early dismissal 
is off the table. 
To give a concrete example, let’s say a plaintiff has a claim 
for a $300,000 injury. Her lawyer believes that with an unbiased 
judge she has a 30 percent chance of winning at trial. But with a 
biased judge, she has only a 10 percent chance of winning at tri-
al. Let’s say that one out of every five judges is biased. Further, 
it costs $10,000 to prepare a complaint and another $70,000 to 
take the case through discovery to trial. In a world without the 
plausibility standard, is this a case worth bringing? 
The answer is no. With an unbiased judge, the expected 
payoff from filing suit is: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ݓ݅݊ ൈ ܬݑ݀݃݉݁݊ݐ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ െ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܿ݋ݏݐ
ൌ ܲܽݕ݋݂݂ 
(9a) 
30%	 ൈ 	$300,000 െ $80,000 ൌ $10,000 (9b) 
With a biased judge, the expected payoff from filing suit is: 
 
10%	 ൈ 	$300,000 െ $80,000 ൌ െ$50,000 (10) 
 So, without knowing whether the judge is biased or not, the 
plaintiff must weigh the 80 percent chance of an unbiased judge 
against the 20 percent chance of a biased judge. The net ex-
pected payoff is negative: 
 
20%	 ൈ	ሺെ$50,000ሻ ൅ 80% ൈ $10,000 ൌ െ$2,000 (11) 
 But under a regime of plausibility pleading, a biased judge 
will dismiss the suit at the outset. The expected payoff with an 
unbiased judge is unchanged, but the expected loss from having 
a biased judge falls. With a biased judge, the suit is dismissed 
right away. This means that with a biased judge, the plaintiff’s 
chance of winning falls to zero, but her costs are limited to the 
costs of preparing the complaint: 
 
0%	 ൈ 	$300,000 െ $10,000 ൌ െ$10,000 (12) 
Because the plaintiff’s losses are limited when she gets a biased 
judge, it is now worthwhile to sue. Her net expected recovery is 
positive: 
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20%	 ൈ	ሺെ$10,000ሻ ൅ 80% ൈ $10,000 ൌ $6,000 (13) 
Of course, most cases will not be close to the margin of filing 
or not filing, nor close to the margin of dismissal. This is what 
the theory in Part I and the evidence in Part III tell us. But im-
portantly, to the extent that cases are close to the margin, the 
plausibility standard increases the net expected value of claims 
when litigation is costly and judicial bias is a serious concern 
later in litigation and not just at the pleading stage.168 
The information value of an early signal from the judge is not 
limited to scenarios of potential judicial bias. More generally, if 
plaintiffs are unsure of their own assessments of the facts, or of 
the legal consequences of those facts, the plausibility pleading 
standard serves as a safety valve. Rather than incurring the ex-
pense of litigating to summary judgment before getting a clear 
signal of the judge’s view of the allegations, a plaintiff gets an 
early signal from the judge ruling on a motion to dismiss before 
having to bear the bulk of the costs of litigation. By creating an 
extra, early signal about the value of the plaintiff’s claim, plead-
ing standards increase the option value of borderline claims, be-
cause they dispose of the weakest claims before the plaintiff has 
to pay for further litigation. Given that litigation costs can be a 
deterrent for plaintiffs with otherwise-worthy claims, a proce-
dural device that reduces expected litigation costs serves, rather 
than disserves, the liberal ethos by providing plaintiffs a slightly 
more meaningful opportunity to bring claims. 
To be clear, we should expect this benefit to be small. I expect 
that most judges are essentially unbiased and that most plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have a good sense of the strength of the claim before fil-
ing. Further, a defendant need not file a motion to dismiss and, as 
a matter of strategy, a defendant will forgo filing a motion to dis-
miss if litigating the motion benefits the plaintiff more than the 
defendant. Thus, it should not be surprising that, as I have al-
ready noted, motions to dismiss remain relatively uncommon 
events, even after Twombly and Iqbal. The fact that plaintiffs 
can benefit from motions to dismiss by getting early signals of 
 
 168 In unreported results (available from the author upon request), I show that this 
conclusion is generally true for cases close to the margin of filing or not filing and for cas-
es close to the plausibility threshold. Of course, if litigation costs are very low, or if judi-
cial bias manifests itself only at the pleading stage, these results do not hold. 
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courts’ inclinations creates a natural check on their overuse by 
defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagining what pleading would look like in a world with no 
pleading standard allows us to take a fresh look at plausibility 
pleading. What we find is that the seemingly stark doctrinal 
change wrought by Twombly and Iqbal should have had an at-
tenuated effect in practice, precisely because the kind of factual-
ly detailed, plausible pleadings that these cases require are what 
most plaintiffs would file anyway—and were what most plain-
tiffs did file before Twombly. Equally importantly, even before 
Twombly and Iqbal, most plaintiffs who were unable to draft 
plausible pleadings simply did not file suit. 
Of course, requiring plausible pleadings will surely have 
some effect. In this respect, my thought experiment helps distin-
guish which plaintiffs may be adversely affected, unaffected, or 
even aided by Twombly and Iqbal. There is widespread concern 
about plaintiffs with claims involving information asymmetries 
facing a paradox of pleading. But plausibility pleading has little 
or no adverse effect on such claims. These claimants do face a 
serious disadvantage, but it is the same disadvantage they faced 
before Twombly and Iqbal: litigation is simply too expensive rel-
ative to their expected recovery. 
On the other hand, we might expect to see more pro se and 
IFP plaintiffs turned away after Twombly and Iqbal, at least if 
the courts do not sufficiently heed the counsel of Erickson. Oth-
er, less sympathetic categories of cases may be affected as well, 
such as cases driven by spite, low-merit cases, or shoot-the-moon 
lawsuits. 
Some plaintiffs may even gain from plausibility pleading 
standards. Litigation is risky and expensive, and an early signal 
from the judge that resolves uncertainty—whether about the 
state of the law or simply the bias of the judge—is valuable. A 
poker player would rather learn that the deck is stacked against 
her when she still has a chance to fold than after going all in. 
Losing a case on a motion to dismiss is bad, but losing for the 
same reasons after spending tens of thousands of dollars on dis-
covery is worse. 
In sum, while most cases are unaffected by plausibility 
pleading standards, we can identify several limited sets of plain-
tiffs that may be affected. The potential effects for these plaintiffs, 
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however, point in different directions. Thus, while plausibility 
pleading may have little or no net effect on the volume of litiga-
tion or the rate of dismissals, it may slightly shift the composi-
tion of cases that reach discovery. 
Finally, while it has been taken for granted that plausibility 
pleading represents a retreat from the liberal ethos of the FRCP, 
this view deserves to be reexamined. The liberal ethos ideals of 
full discovery and trial were never realized under notice plead-
ing; plausibility pleading does nothing to change this. But the 
liberal ethos goal of resolving cases on the merits is largely 
served, rather than disserved, by plausibility pleading. Resolving 
cases on the merits—even with considerable inaccuracy—at the 
pleading stage must be judged against the alternative, which is 
settling cases. Settlement on the merits is surely preferable to 
dismissal, but settlement not on the merits is worse. By leaving 
most cases unaffected, but affecting (at least on the margin) cas-
es driven by nonmerits factors such as nuisance value, spite, or 
lottery-ticket stakes, plausibility pleading promotes the ideal of 
resolution on the merits in a world in which the ideal of trial on 
the merits is usually little more than an aspiration. 
There is one last wrinkle. We might expect that cases with 
plausible claims will settle on the merits and that cases with 
very high stakes or asymmetrical litigation costs will settle not 
on the merits. But “cases with plausible claims” and “cases with 
very high stakes or asymmetrical discovery costs” are not exclu-
sive categories. A case can be both.169 And while cases with a mix 
of plausible merit, high stakes, and asymmetrical costs are likely 
a small set of all filed cases, they may have a disproportionate 
impact on federal civil litigation as a whole.170 How to deal with 
litigation that is driven by both merit and asymmetric litigation 
costs remains a critical policy question for civil procedure. 
 
 
 169 See Marcus, 86 Colum L Rev at 479 (cited in note 12) (“The problem is identifying 
a strike suit. . . . [T]here is no intrinsic relation between litigation expense or other disa-
greeable side effects of a lawsuit and the absence of merit in [a] plaintiff’s case.”); 
Spencer, 49 BC L Rev at 452 (cited in note 4) (noting that “discovery abuse in the form of 
impositional requests is not an evil unique to groundless or insufficiently pleaded claims” 
because “[s]uch abuse can occur regardless of whether the underlying claims are legiti-
mate or meritless, well-pleaded or not”). 
 170 See William H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Lit-
igation, 64 Cath U L Rev 867, 896 (2015) (noting that 5 percent of cases account for more 
than half of all litigation costs). 
